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The Psychology of Procedural Justice
in the Federal Courts
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff∗
This interdisciplinary Article examines our federal court system from the perspective of
the psychology of procedural justice—that is, subjective perceptions about the fairness
of process. The Article considers some of the central features of civil litigation from the
standpoint of the psychology of procedural justice, highlighting some of the aspects of
the system that are likely to increase perceptions of fair process, and exploring,
conversely, rules and practices that may decrease those perceptions. The Article focuses
on procedural justice in two contexts: basic rules and practices of civil procedure and
more complex federal court doctrines that involve the allocation of judicial business
between the states and the federal government. In both cases, procedural justice is
considered from the perspective of litigants involved in civil disputes; in the latter case,
the analysis broadens to encompass the procedural justice experiences of other
important actors in civil litigation, including judges, legislators, and state executives.
This Article argues that, while legal academics have typically analyzed the fairness of
federal procedure and rules through an analysis of procedural due process, the
psychology of procedural justice provides an important and potentially wider
perspective from which to consider the procedural fairness of our legal system. Because
perceptions about fair process are critical to assessments of legitimacy and deference to
legal authority, scholars in both law and psychology should devote greater attention—
both empirical and theoretical—to the potential procedural justice effects of specific
legal rules and doctrine.
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Introduction
How satisfied are litigants with our federal courts? Do litigants and
the public perceive the federal courts and their decisions as legitimate?
Research in social psychology suggests that the fairness of process, or
1
“procedural justice,” provides the key to answering these critical
1. See generally John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological
Analysis (1975). As discussed at greater length, infra Part I.B, legal scholars have also explored
procedural justice from a nonpsychological perspective. See, e.g., David Resnick, Due Process and
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questions. This research has indicated that when people feel that they
have been treated fairly by decisionmaking authorities, they are more
likely to accept and comply with decisions, feel satisfied with outcomes,
2
and believe in the legitimacy of the authority. These perceptions of
procedural justice, then, play an important role in ensuring the successful
functioning of our legal system. This Article offers an interdisciplinary
3
analysis of federal civil litigation through the lens of the psychology of
procedural justice, suggesting ways in which certain rules and doctrines
may foster or frustrate perceptions of fair process.
A focus on fair process and legitimacy is certainly no stranger to
4
legal theorists, as a voluminous body of scholarship demonstrates. From
the legal side, scholars consider the elements of process fairness
5
historically, philosophically, and doctrinally. These analyses range from
broad philosophical examinations of the legal system’s theoretical
6
underpinnings with respect to fairness to a more fine-grained analysis of
7
the fairness of individual rules and doctrines. Two (sometimes entwined)
approaches dominate legal work on the fairness of procedure. First,
scholars have endeavored to formulate comprehensive theories about
procedural fairness that sort through and reconcile economic, social,
8
political, and dignitary concerns, among others. Second, commentators
have considered fair process from the perspective of procedural due
process, using this constitutional benchmark to assess fair process in any
9
given context.
Legal scholars examining process fairness and social psychologists
studying procedural justice thus share a concern with processes, separate
and distinct from—albeit sometimes related to—substantive outcomes.

Procedural Justice, in Due Process: Nomos XVIII 206, 206–07 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1977); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 238 (2004). In
this Article, I generally use the term procedural justice to refer specifically to the psychological
concept of individual subjective assessment of process fairness, and use the term procedural fairness to
refer more broadly to a host of issues surrounding fair process, including issues of system design.
2. See generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural
Justice (1988).
3. Procedural justice effects have been found in the criminal context, see infra note 23, and a
similar analysis is certainly feasible for criminal cases. However, this Article expressly limits its focus
to civil cases in the federal system.
4. See infra Parts I.B.1–I.B.2.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See infra notes 71–86.
7. See, e.g., Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as SelfInvention, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 79, 82 (2009); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions,
Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1573, 1575
(2007).
8. See infra notes 71–86.
9. See, e.g., William G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the
Constitutional Outline, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 545 (1971); Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due
Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 347 (1988).
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Yet despite the fundamental concern over fair process in each discipline,
10
rarely have the twain met. Scholars writing in these two areas—even as
they use similar and sometimes even identical language—take
fundamentally different tacks as they grapple with the relationship
between fair process, fair outcome, and the legitimacy of the system as a
11
whole. Neither the first, more philosophical strain nor the second, more
doctrinal strain of legal scholarship on process fairness has systematically
considered or focused on empirical data about individual perceptions of
12
procedural fairness. Psychologists, in contrast, are typically concerned
purely with subjective experiences with the legal system, without regard
13
to broader historical, philosophical, or doctrinal bases. And while some
legal scholars have examined the procedural fairness of particular rules
and doctrines, psychologists usually consider participants’ broad-brush ex
post opinions about the sum total of their treatment in the legal system,
rather than examining the specific effects of any individual rules or
procedures, despite the fact that global perceptions of fairness are likely
14
to be a product of the cumulative impact of these effects. While legal
scholars’ work may overlook the fact that the legal system is made up not
just of rules and structures, but of real disputes engaged in by real
people, psychology in turn may undervalue the importance of specific
legal structures and philosophical meaning.
In this Article, I begin to bridge the gap between the legal and
psychological perspectives by exploring the psychology of procedural
justice as it plays out on the ground of federal court litigation. As part of
this exploration, I also argue that legal commentators’ focus on theories
of procedural fairness and on procedural due process, while of grave
importance, is nonetheless limited in its capacity to fully address issues
about citizens’ actual perceptions of fairness and legitimacy. I demonstrate
the distinct scope of a psychological procedural justice analysis in several

10. But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 162 (1985) (providing a
very brief discussion of Thibaut and Walker’s work on procedural justice in context of whether
procedural protections are valued for instrumental or dignitary reasons); Frank I. Michelman, Formal
and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in Due Process: Nomos XVIII, supra note 1, at
126, 127 (noting summarily, without exploring empirical data or psychological research, that
participatory opportunity may be “psychologically important” to litigants).
11. The distinction between process and outcome is well beyond the scope of this Article; I mean,
in restricting myself to a discussion of process fairness, to focus on issues that are not distributive or
substantive in nature, acknowledging that this distinction is most certainly imperfect and, in fact,
somewhat circular. See infra note 75.
12. This failure to include the psychological framework is not accidental. See, e.g., Robert G.
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness,
83 B.U. L. Rev. 485, 506 (2003) (stating that there is a “fatal defect” in using empirical data about the
psychology of procedural justice); Solum, supra note 1, at 267 (“[T]he satisfaction interpretation of the
participation model fails as a stand-alone theory of procedural justice.”).
13. See Bone, supra note 12, at 505–07.
14. See id.
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ways. I first explain the fundamental difference in meaning and goals
between theoretical accounts of procedural fairness in law and empirical
research on procedural justice perceptions; I also explicitly examine the
similarities and differences between procedural due process and
procedural justice in psychology. Additionally, as I analyze the
procedural justice experience of civil litigants in the federal court system
in a variety of contexts, I make clear how this analysis departs from the
classic procedural due process paradigm that has previously been applied
to particular rules and practices. Similarly, I explain how procedural
justice effects might be found among parties, such as lawyers, judges, and
legislators, who are well beyond the scope of a procedural due process
analysis.
In Part I, I explore the contours of procedural justice in psychology,
procedural justice in law, and procedural due process, examining the
questions of how they differ. Although the frameworks do overlap
conceptually, I argue that the psychological perspective is not subordinate
to a theoretical account of procedural justice, nor merely duplicative of a
procedural due process analysis. Instead, because it provides a much
broader and more cross-cutting framework, as well as a way to actually
measure the experiences of real individuals, examining the psychology of
procedural justice adds to an understanding of our legal system in a way
that both complements and deepens classic legal analysis. In this section,
I also discuss the parties for whom procedural justice is relevant,
including a consideration of the role of lawyers versus clients and
individuals versus entities.
In Part II, I look to several basic rules of federal civil litigation
through the procedural justice lens, describing the factors that lead to
perceptions about procedural justice in psychology and considering how
they play out in the context of a host of relatively straightforward civil
procedure rules—including those governing notice, pleading, motion
practice, and discovery.
Part III examines more complex federal court doctrine through this
same lens. I consider diversity jurisdiction and abstention from the
viewpoint of individual litigants. I then expand my analysis—and
demonstrate the wider applicability of the procedural justice paradigm—
by considering procedural justice from a systemic perspective, from the
viewpoint of federal and state judges, legislators, and executives. All of
these parties have a stake in the division of business between federal and
state courts, and these individuals are able to form an opinion about the
procedural justice of the judicial decisions about which forum will hear
any given case.
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest several implications of my analysis for
the legal system and for empirical work in law and psychology. I argue
that the details relevant to procedural justice in the basic federal rules, as
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well as in allocating the business of the court between state and federal
forums, are important to fundamental perceptions of the legitimacy of
our federal court system by individual litigants and government actors,
and that courts and rule makers ought to pay greater attention to the
likely impact of procedure in light of what research has shown about how
individuals form judgments about fair process. In addition, I suggest that
psychological research could provide greater insight into the experiences
of litigants and government actors by focusing more closely on
individuals’ perceptions of fairness about specific legal rules and doctrines.

I. Procedural Justice: Psychology Versus Law
A. The Psychology of Procedural Justice
Over thirty years ago, psychologists began to research legal systems
in an effort to increase compliance with judicial decisions. In particular,
researchers focused on what kinds of processes would seem most fair to
disputants and would lead to increased acceptance of and adherence to
15
judicial decisions. This research provided robust empirical evidence that
individuals care deeply about the fairness of the process by which
decisions are made, apart from considerations about the outcome of the
decision. Procedural justice scholars do not suggest that individuals are
indifferent to the favorability or the fairness of their outcomes; those
16
things do matter, and often matter a lot. But the additional component
of fair treatment by a decisionmaking authority matters as well—and
matters independently, apart from the effect that fair treatment has on
17
fair and good outcomes.
John Thibaut and Laurens Walker’s original procedural justice
research took place in a controlled laboratory setting, in which
participants rated dispute-resolution mechanisms that afforded them a
higher degree of control over process as more procedurally fair than
18
other mechanisms. Participants’ view of a particular process as fair was
significantly related to their satisfaction with outcomes that the process
19
produced. From this original research stemmed a multitude of
subsequent studies that amplified, clarified, honed, and expanded our
20
understanding of the role of procedural justice, including the scope of
15. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 121.
16. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in Handbook of Justice Research in Law
65, 71 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
17. Id.
18. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 119.
19. Id.
20. As Robert MacCoun has said, “Few if any socio-legal topics . . . have received as much
attention using as many different research methods.” Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and
Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 171, 173
(2005).
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contexts where procedural justice is relevant, the particular effects
procedural justice has on individuals, the antecedent conditions for
determining procedural justice, and the underlying mechanisms
21
explaining why procedural justice is important. I briefly review the
various facets of this research below.
Procedural justice research has shown that procedural justice effects
are present in a wide range of settings. Civil litigants in court care about
22
their treatment by a judge, criminal defendants care about their
23
treatment by judge and jury, disputing parties in arbitration and
24
25
mediation care about their treatment by an arbitrator or mediator, and
even disputing parties in negotiation care about their treatment by the
26
other party. Research outside the legal dispute resolution system has
demonstrated that people care about their treatment by other authority
27
28
figures, such as police officers, work supervisors, and health-care
29
administrators. Beyond both the legal dispute-resolution context and
the third party context, research has suggested that individuals care
30
about procedural justice in highly relational settings like the family and
31
even in classic economic settings like markets. Effects are found in field

21. See, e.g., id. at 190–93.
22. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 104–06 (2006).
23. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 483, 485
(1988); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury,
12 Law & Hum. Behav. 333, 339–40 (1988). For a more theoretical examination of how procedural
justice may play a role in plea bargaining, see Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural
Justice, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 407, 416 (2008).
24. E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness
as a Decision Heuristic, 38 Admin. Sci. Q. 224, 235–36 (1993).
25. Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 313, 327
(1993).
26. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural
Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 Law & Soc. Inquiry 473, 478–79 (2008).
27. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping
Public Support for Policing, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 513, 534 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger,
Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction with Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 Basic &
Applied Soc. Psychol. 281 (1980); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police
Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority,
42 Criminology 253, 254 (2004).
28. Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice in the Workplace, 1 Soc. Just. Research
143, 143 (1987); Robert Folger & Mary A. Konovsky, Effects of Procedural and Distributive Justice on
Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions, 32 Acad. Mgmt. J. 115, 128 (1989); Tom R. Tyler, Promoting
Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory
Approaches, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1287, 1291 (2005).
29. See generally Virginia Murphy-Berman et al., Fairness and Health Care Decision Making:
Testing the Group Value Model of Procedural Justice, 12 Soc. Just. Research 117 (1999).
30. Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Disputes: A Psychosocial
Analysis of Individual and Family Functioning in Late Adolescence, 27 J. Youth & Adolescence 101,
114–15 (1998); Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Conflict:
Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 Law & Pol’y 101, 118–19 (1999).
31. Harris Sondak & Tom R. Tyler, How Does Procedural Justice Shape the Desirability of
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studies, simulations and experimental settings, and in situations with
34
35
both low and very high stakes.
Research has suggested that procedural justice is an important
component of individuals’ judgments about whether to comply with legal
36
rules and authorities, as well as whether legal systems are legitimate.
When people feel that they have received fair treatment, they are more
likely to adhere to, accept, and feel satisfied with a given outcome, and to
37
view the system that gave rise to that outcome as legitimate.
Psychologists have focused almost exclusively on individuals’
38
subjective perceptions of procedural justice. This subjective focus, far
from troubling researchers, is in fact a central component of justice
research in psychology. As Tom Tyler has explained,
The especially striking thing about social justice is that it is a social
concept that exists only in the minds of the members of an ongoing
interaction, a group, an organization, or a society. Hence, justice is a
socially created concept that . . . has no physical reality. It exists and is
39
useful to the degree that it is shared among a group of people.

For psychologists, measuring subjective perceptions of procedural
justice is important because this measurement captures individuals’ real
experiences of fairness or unfairness of the legal system, as opposed to
the effects that the system’s architects might think or expect to be likely
40
products of the system’s structure and rules.

Markets?, 28 J. Econ. Psychol. 79, 80 (2007).
32. Raymond Paternoster, et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on
Spouse Assault, 31 Law & Soc’y Rev. 163, 166 (1997) (showing procedural justice effects in a study in
which the data was collected based on actual offenders’ experiences).
33. See, e.g., Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 30 (showing procedural justice effects in a study
in which first-year law students participated in a simulation in which they acted as attorneys).
34. See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 26, at 479 (presenting the results of a study
involving student performance on an in-class negotiation exercise); Tyler, supra note 22, at 19 (“This
book . . . examines the general level of noncompliance with everyday laws regulating behavior. Its
concern is with the degree to which people generally follow the law in their daily lives.”).
35. E. Allan Lind, Arbitrating High Stakes Cases: An Evaluation of Court-Annexed
Arbitration in a United States District Court 65–66 (1990) (finding that litigants in high-stakes
arbitration cases evaluate procedural fairness similarly to litigants in low-stakes ADR studies);
Paternoster et al., supra note 32 (finding that procedural justice effects can help deter spousal assault
recidivism); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of their
Courtroom Experience, 18 Law & Soc’y Rev. 51 (1984) (finding that defendants sentenced to steep
prison terms are more satisfied and more positive in their views of decisionmaking authorities when
the defendants perceive the authorities as being honest and unbiased, and when the legal process itself
seems fair).
36. See Tyler, supra note 22, at 162.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., MacCoun & Tyler, supra note 23, at 335–56.
39. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 Int’l J. Psychol. 117, 117–18 (2000).
40. See, e.g., MacCoun & Tyler, supra note 23, at 335–36.
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Researchers have also studied the factors that individuals use to
41
form judgments about whether they have been treated fairly. Although
numerous factors have been identified, Tyler has argued that “four
elements of procedures are the primary factors that contribute to
42
judgments about their fairness.” These elements include: (1) how much
voice and opportunity to be heard the party believes she has experienced,
(2) neutrality of the forum, (3) the trustworthiness of the decisionmaker,
and (4) the degree to which the individual has been treated with dignity
43
and respect. As noted above, the importance of these factors in forming
procedural justice assessments does not in any way preclude the
importance of other factors, such as concerns about costs, accuracy,
44
winning, or punishment, to name a few. All of these other factors may
play a role in how individuals evaluate distributive justice, outcome
45
favorability, or their more general satisfaction with outcome.
Psychologists suggest, however, that these other factors are not a critical
component of how individuals form judgments about the fairness of a
46
decisionmaking process.
Psychologists have suggested that perceptions about control over
process are an important determinant of whether people feel that
47
procedural justice has occurred. Individuals typically determine their
degree of process control by assessing how much participation they have
had in the dispute resolution process—that is, how much voice and
48
opportunity to be heard they have experienced. Participation is perhaps
the most robustly researched of the factors that contribute to procedural
49
50
justice. Its effects have been widely noted, in both laboratory and field
51
52
studies. Participation yields procedural justice results in civil litigation,

41. See Tyler, supra note 39, at 121.
42. Id.
43. Id. While courtesy and respect were originally conceptualized as the interpersonal or social
component of procedural justice, some psychologists have suggested that courtesy and respect are
more properly considered in the context of “interactional justice,” which is conceptually distinct from
“procedural justice.” See, e.g., Robert J. Bies & Joseph S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication
Criteria of Fairness, in 1 Research on Negotiation in Organizations 47 (Roy J. Lewicki et al. eds.,
1986); Robert J. Bies, Interactional (In)Justice: The Sacred and the Profane, in Advances in
Organizational Justice 89 (Jerald Greenberg & Russell Cropanzano eds., 2001). However, there is a
lively debate on this issue among researchers, and at present, I incorporate courtesy and respect into
my procedural justice analysis in keeping with the work of Tyler and others.
44. See Tyler, supra note 39, at 119.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., id. at 119–20.
48. See id. at 121.
49. See id.
50. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 4.
51. See, e.g., Jane W. Adler et al., Simple Justice: How Litigants Fare in the Pittsburgh
Court Arbitration Program 65 (1983); Robert J. MacCoun et al., Alternative Adjudication: An
Evaluation of the New Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program 43 (1988); Jonathan D. Casper et
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54

mediation, and criminal law. Not surprisingly, individuals value
participation highly when they believe that their input will have an effect
55
on the decision at hand, but perhaps more interestingly, individuals also
place value on the opportunity for voice even in contexts where they are
56
aware that their participation will not meaningfully affect the decision.
Neutrality and trust are distinct but related factors. Neutrality
means that decisionmakers are honest, impartial, and objective, and that
they do not allow their own personal values and biases to enter into their
decisionmaking calculus; instead, this calculus should be based on rules
57
and facts. Trustworthiness, in contrast, suggests that the decisionmaker’s
motivation is above board: that the decisionmaker is “benevolent and
caring, is concerned about [the parties’] situation and their concerns and
needs, considers their arguments, tries to do what is right for them, and
58
tries to be fair.” Obviously, these are intertwined judgments: if a
decisionmaker were manifestly nonneutral and biased, it would be very
difficult for that decisionmaker simultaneously to be trustworthy.
However, neutrality relates fundamentally to the set of rules that an
authority is using, while trustworthiness encapsulates a separate (albeit
quite often related) judgment about that authority’s motives. Finally,
research has suggested that individuals value being treated with courtesy
and respect, because these factors “recognize[] and acknowledge[]”
59
individuals’ “dignity as people and as members of society.”
Psychologists have proffered three main theories for why individuals
care about procedural justice separate and apart from outcome
favorability and outcome fairness. First, the original procedural justice
researchers, Thibaut and Walker, believed that procedural justice was
important to people because what people really cared about was in fact
60
outcomes. In this purely instrumental model, they hypothesized that
al., supra note 23, at 485; E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 Law & Soc’y Rev. 953, 954 (1990).
52. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 1.
53. See, e.g., Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents’
Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 553, 554 (1993).
54. See generally Anne M. Heinz & Wayne A. Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference:
Evaluation of a Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 Law & Soc’y Rev. 349 (1979); Pauline Houlden, Impact
of Procedural Modifications on Evaluations of Plea Bargaining, 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 267 (1980–1981).
55. See generally Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes Underlying
Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation and Arbitration, 65 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 1167 (1993).
56. See generally E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and
Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 952 (1990); Tom
R. Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Test of
Four Models, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 333 (1987).
57. Tyler, supra note 39, at 122.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 81.
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people cared about fair process because of a belief that only a fair
61
process would yield a fair outcome. Thibaut and Walker suggested that
62
fair process was valuable solely because of its effects on outcome.
Second, over a decade later, Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind posited that
the desire for, and importance of, fair process was not so inextricably
63
linked to outcomes. They suggested in their “group value model” that
people care about fair process because when an authority figure treats an
individual in a fair manner, that authority figure conveys positive
64
information to an individual about that individual’s status in society.
This in turn affects the individual’s self-esteem and other psychological
65
factors. Tyler and Lind’s research made clear that instrumental effects
66
could not fully account for the importance of procedural justice. Finally,
Kees van den Bos and colleagues have suggested more recently that
people find it difficult to know how to assess their outcomes, and use fair
process as a heuristic, or shortcut, to form judgments about their
67
outcomes. “Fairness heuristic theory” thus suggests that the main value
of fair process is to serve as a type of proxy for judgments about
68
outcomes in the face of uncertainty.
The findings from over three decades of research on the psychology
of procedural justice research stand in sharp contrast to the continuing
insistence of law and economics scholars that individuals are most
69
interested, in any given setting, in maximizing their economic outcomes.
This exclusive focus on instrumental gain has repeatedly been refuted
70
empirically, in both the procedural justice and other contexts. Simply
put, the empirical evidence suggests that individuals value fairness of
process, separate and apart from outcome, because of the special
message that fairness of process sends to its recipients: an authority who

61. Id.
62. Id. at 89–90.
63. Tyler & Lind, supra note 16, at 66–67.
64. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model,
57 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 830, 830–31 (1989).
65. Id. at 837. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in
Groups, in 25 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 115, 115 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992).
66. Tyler & Lind, supra note 65, at 143–44.
67. Kees van den Bos et al., How Do I Judge My Outcome When I Do Not Know the Outcome of
Others? The Psychology of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1034, 1034 (1997).
68. Id.
69. As Lynn Stout explains, this perspective portrays the rational actor who “worries only about
himself, calculatingly and opportunistically pursuing the course of action that brings him the greatest
material advantage.” Lynn Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People 4
(2011). She further notes the widespread dissemination of this viewpoint throughout and beyond
economics. Id.
70. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness 217–18 (2006) (explaining the notion of
“declining marginal utility,” which theorizes that more money does not always lead to increased
happiness).
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acts in a fair manner is an authority who is legitimate and cares about the
dignity and social standing of those who stand before it.
B. Procedural Justice in Law
1.

Theories of Procedural Justice

Philosophers and legal scholars have grappled with the question of
fair process, attempting to offer a unified general conception of the role
71
of fair procedures and what such fair procedures would look like. As
with the psychology of procedural justice, theorists have largely fallen
into two camps when offering their visions for procedural fairness: some
focus on the outcomes that a given process will produce (the
instrumental approach), while others focus mainly on process per se,
72
without much regard to outcome (the dignitary approach).
The instrumental theories begin from a premise that the legal
system is designed, at heart, to produce substantively accurate outcomes.
As Robert Bone has noted, “Outcome-based theories assume that the
primary purpose of adjudication is to produce outcomes that enforce the
substantive law. . . . This is not to say that procedure cannot produce
value in other ways, but it is to say that its primary value lies in the
73
decisions, judgments, and settlements it generates.” The instrumental
theorists, starting from this premise, suggest that a fair process is
meaningful because it is only through fair procedures that parties can
74
achieve a substantively just outcome. As Laurence Tribe has explained,
this perspective indicates that the system is designed “less to assure
75
participation than to use participation to assure accuracy.” Furthermore,
case law has explicitly reflected this notion: in Fuentes v. Shevin, the
Supreme Court described “the Constitutional right to be heard” not as
purely a device to “ensure abstract fair play to the individual,” but rather,
“more particularly . . . to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken

71. The volume of literature on fair process is too large to cite completely here. For a set of
varying perspectives, see, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A Matter
of Principle 72, 72–73 (1985); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 38–51
(2002); Mashaw, supra note 10, at 162; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999); Solum,
supra note 1, at 238.
72. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 666–67 (2d ed. 1988).
73. Robert Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1011, 1015–16 (2010).
74. Conversely, instrumental theory suggests only that those fair procedures that meaningfully
yield a substantively just outcome are important. Other fair procedures are irrelevant—and worse,
inefficient. For example, one treatise explains that “the quantum and quality of the process due in a
particular situation depends on the need to serve the due process function of minimizing the risk of
error in decision-making.” 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 957 (2009) (citing Gilbert v. Homar,
520 U.S. 924 (1997)).
75. Tribe, supra note 72, at 667; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process,
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85, 112–13 (1982) (“Substance and process are intimately related. The procedures
one uses determine how much substance is achieved, and by whom.”).
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76

deprivations of property.” This means that in order to create the
“appropriate” level of procedural due process, the legal system must
calibrate its investments in procedures with the attendant reduction in
77
error risk.
In contrast, dignitary theories of procedural due process argue that
its importance lies in its intrinsic, non-instrumental value—in its value in
78
enforcing norms about human dignity and human interaction in society.
Dignitary theorists of procedural due process take the perspective that
the value of process relates to the role of the human being in society,
79
rather than to the type of outcome achieved. Tribe has described the
due process right to be heard as “a valued human interaction in which
the affected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in
the decision that vitally concerns her,” and has concluded that this right,
“analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome,”
conveys “the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is
80
at least to be consulted about what is done with one.” Tribe further
noted the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, who wrote that the “validity
and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by
81
which it was reached.” As Tribe explained, “At stake here is not just the
much-acclaimed appearance of justice but, from a perspective that treats
82
process as intrinsically significant, the very essence of justice.” Jerry
Mashaw has argued that “the dignitary approach is both necessary to and
83
sufficient for an adequate jurisprudence of due process.”
Other explanations for procedural justice are harder to pigeonhole.
For example, Lawrence Solum has suggested that participation is the
core value for procedural justice and that procedural justice’s main value
in the adjudicatory process is not reducible to instrumental concerns
84
about cost or accuracy, but rather is purely as a legitimating feature.
That is, a process that does not allow for participation is illegitimate, and
participation is important not solely for its value in producing better or

76. 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976); Mallette v.
Arlington Cnty. Emps.’ Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 641 (4th Cir. 1996).
77. By characterizing the right to due process as a right to procedures that will, in turn, produce
the substantively fair outcome to which one also has a (paramount) right, these theorists have
inextricably wedded efficiency to the rights discourse. As Bone has explained, “Obviously, parties
cannot have a right to perfect accuracy since perfection is impossible. More precisely, if the right
guaranteed perfect accuracy, every case would involve a rights violation, which hardly fits common
intuitions of procedural fairness.” Bone, supra note 73, at 1016.
78. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 72, at 667.
79. See, e.g., id.
80. Id. at 666.
81. Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
82. Id.
83. Mashaw, supra note 10, at 169.
84. Solum, supra note 1, at 273–75.
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more efficient outcomes, but distinctly for its central role in legitimating
85
the process itself. Bruce Hay also explored the idea of procedural
justice, suggesting that procedural justice merely captured the subjective
experience of any process that an individual would agree to, ex ante, for
86
the resolution of disputes.
While this body of scholarship on procedural justice engages with
questions about fairness in serious and important ways, its goal is
fundamentally different than that of procedural justice in psychology.
The legal and philosophical literature is explicitly normative, while the
psychological literature is explicitly descriptive. Psychological research
on procedural justice does not argue for or against particular tenets of
fair process. Rather, it seeks to measure and quantify how individuals
form judgments about fairness in particular situations and what effects
these judgments then have. The philosophical and legal theory
perspectives, in contrast, rely on philosophical conceptions about the
nature of procedural justice rather than on any empirical research, or
empirical consensus, about the features that make a particular process
appear fair to participants. While it is certainly true that there is a
dynamic relationship between these perspectives—that psychology
shapes our sense of which rules and systems are acceptable, and that the
systems we create in turn influence our psychological experiences—they
each offer a distinct outlook on fairness. This project focuses not on
offering a grand unified theory of procedural justice in law, but instead
on the ways in which real individuals are likely to experience procedural
justice through the civil litigation process in federal court.
2.

Procedural Due Process

Much of the legal scholarship on the fairness of the process of
litigation has centered around procedural due process. Procedural due
87
process, a bedrock feature of our legal system, defines the appropriate
level of procedural safeguards that must be in place to ensure a fair legal
process, and scholars have considered at great length these safeguards’
88
89
90
contours, pedigree, and theoretical basis. The constitutional right to

85. Solum, supra note 1, at 275; see also Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 13–14 (1974).
86. Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1803, 1804 (1997).
87. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 547 (3d ed.
2006) (“The concept of procedural due process has never been controversial.”); Edward L. Rubin,
Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 1044, 1044 (1984) (recognizing that
procedural due process is the oldest of our civil rights).
88. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 309–10 (1993) (“Due process doctrine subsists in
confusion. . . . [My aim is] less to offer normative prescriptions than to sort out a handful of conceptual
misunderstandings in some closely related areas of due process doctrine.”); Cynthia R. Farina,
Conceiving Due Process, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism 189, 189 (1991) (“Scratch the smooth, plausible skin
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due process, found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, has
been interpreted to include a right to procedural, substantive, and
91
structural due process. Procedural due process “delineates the
constitutional limits on judicial, executive, and administrative enforcement
92
of legislative or other governmental dictates or decisions.” Put simply,
93
procedural due process is about “adequate safeguards.” The “core
elements of due process” include notice of the issue in the case, the
94
opportunity for a hearing, and an impartial decisionmaker. Scholars
have emphasized the fundamental nature of these factors in determining
whether procedural due process requirements have been met:
[T]he core content of procedural due process placed upon government
the duty to give notice and an opportunity to be heard to individuals or
groups whose interests in life, liberty or property were adversely
affected by government action. The assurance of a fair trial or at least a
fair hearing mandated that the individual be accorded an open hearing
before a “neutral and detached magistrate” who has no “direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him in his case,” and who is free from domination by “a mob,” with
95
counsel provided for indigents in criminal cases.

Determining the exact procedures required to yield procedural due
process for any given party requires a context-specific analysis by the
96
courts, which have considered the question in areas as disparate as

of the doctrine and there lies turmoil, contradiction, and instability, a pathological combination of
ineffectualness and destructiveness.”); Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational
Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 4 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 79, 141–42 (2009); Martin H. Redish & William
J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual
Representation Dilemma, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1877, 1917–18 (2009); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence
C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455,
456 (1986); Rubin, supra, note 87, at 1044 (“The procedural due process doctrine is now the subject of
intense debate, with its central meaning regularly questioned by both courts and commentators.”).
89. See Rubin, supra note 87, at 1044 (“The positive law history of the doctrine dates back to the
Magna Carta.”). See generally Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding,
4 Const. Comment. 339 (1987).
90. See supra notes 71–86.
91. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 72, at 665–77; Rubin, supra note 87, at 1044.
92. Tribe, supra note 72, at 664 (emphasis removed). In contrast, substantive due process “asks
whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property.”
Chemerinsky, supra note 87, at 546. In contrast to procedural due process, substantive due process is a
concept that has been controversial. Id. at 547.
93. Chemerinsky, supra note 87, at 546.
94. Id. at 580.
95. Tribe, supra note 72, at 683–84 (citations omitted) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 449 (1971); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90–91
(1923)).
96. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (“‘Due Process’ . . . is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” (citation
omitted)); Redish & Marshall, supra note 88, at 456 (“[T]he content of due process is extremely
flexible, and not susceptible to precise definition.”).

Hollander-Blumoff_22 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

142

12/5/2011 11:33 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
97

98

99

[Vol. 63:127
100

forfeiture, prisoners’ rights, children’s rights, and family rights. The
specific procedures required have been tailored to the needs of the
particular setting. Without a doubt, however, commentators agree that
the cornerstone of procedural due process is the right to one’s “day in
101
102
court” before an impartial decisionmaker.
C. The Wide Net of the Psychology of Procedural Justice
Procedural due process and procedural justice in psychology have
some clear conceptual overlap. First, the two share a focus on the
meaningful nature of participation in legal proceedings. Procedural due
103
process calls such participation notice and an opportunity to be heard,
while procedural justice calls it voice, process control, or opportunity to
104
be heard. Second, procedural due process and procedural justice also
share a focus on the importance of an impartial decisionmaker who uses
a set of substantive rules rather than personal biases to make decisions;
the procedural due process “impartial decisionmaker” term can
potentially encompass both the neutrality and the trustworthiness
105
elements of procedural justice.
However, where procedural due process elevates concerns about
voice, neutrality, and trustworthiness to a constitutional level and thus
requires some minimum standard of conduct, procedural justice merely
asks individuals to what degree they felt that such concerns were met.
Courts fix the legal system’s procedural due process requirements,
presumably at some threshold level that will ensure fair treatment for
participants. In contrast, the subjective experience of procedural justice
can be measured on a continuous, sliding scale that includes unfair, very
fair, and all the shades of fair in between.
Another distinction between the two concepts is that procedural due
process does not expressly enshrine courteous and respectful treatment
as a constitutional guarantee. Again, this difference in included criteria
97. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (choosing Mullane standard
over Mathews standard for forfeiture cases).
98. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983) (“[L]awfully incarcerated persons retain
only a narrow range of protected liberty interests. . . . [O]ur decisions have consistently refused to
recognize more than the most basic liberty interests in prisoners.”).
99. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (holding that children have due process
rights in connection with disciplinary actions taken by schools).
100. See, e.g., Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the government
may not remove children from their homes without providing due process).
101. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
102. Redish & Marshall, supra note 88, at 457 (arguing that the only truly necessary—and perhaps
even sufficient—requirement of due process is that an impartial decisionmaker hear the case); see also
Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 9 (2006).
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
104. Solum, supra note 1, at 183.
105. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 6; Tyler, supra note 39, at 122.
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points out clearly that while procedural due process jurisprudence
ensures some minimum level of conduct by courts and litigants with
respect to fairness of process, it does not encompass all of the behavior
that individuals use to form their judgments about when they have been
treated fairly.
From a theoretical perspective, the explanations for why procedural
justice and procedural due process matter largely dovetail, falling into
106
one of two camps, instrumental or dignitary. First, Thibaut and
Walker’s original instrumentalist perspective on procedural justice is
reflected by what the instrumental theorists of due process have argued.
Second, as noted above, other scholars have suggested, in rough parallel
to the Tyler relational group value model, that the value of procedural
due process lies in its dignitary and legitimizing value to the individual in
society.
Although legal theorists and social psychologists may not share the
same vocabulary, and discourse between them is far too rare,
psychology’s insights into how individuals make sense of and evaluate
dispute resolution processes comport with the reasons legal scholars have
offered for why fair processes matter. From this perspective, the
psychology of procedural justice can help inform the debate over why we
ought to care about fair process. Research in psychology has suggested
that individuals do care about the instrumental value of fairness, but has
also suggested that individuals do not solely care about the instrumental
value of fairness. That is, empirical work has supported the idea that
individuals value fair treatment, separately and independently from its
107
instrumental value, for its dignitary importance. In turn, a focus on the
dignitary importance of fair process leaves us freer to care more about
aspects of procedures that scholars focused on procedural due process
might leave on the cutting room floor because they are not bound up
with accuracy and substantive rights.
Another important distinction between procedural justice in
psychology and procedural due process is that procedural due process, by
definition, is about what protections a person is due before she is
108
deprived of life, liberty, or property by the government. Scholars have
focused on the particular circumstances in which procedural due process
may be required because of such deprivations. Property has been defined
109
110
expansively for procedural due process purposes, as has liberty.

106. Fairness heuristic theory has no parallel in the due process literature.
107. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 65, at 135.
108. Tribe, supra note 72, at 666.
109. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543–44 (1985) (holding that
government employees have a property interest in their employment, and thus they are entitled to
procedural due process prior to termination); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (“[W]hen
welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with
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Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[T]he range of
111
interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite.” There are
interests that procedural due process protections do not cover, and yet
parties with those interests at issue will experience procedural justice—a
subjective experience about how fairly they have been treated—when
courts resolve their disputes.
Furthermore, because procedural due process protection is only
triggered by a deprivation of protected rights, procedural due process is
typically considered in the context of a party who has something to lose.
Therefore, courts and scholars gravitate towards analyzing the
procedural due process rights of a defendant in civil litigation or of a
plaintiff in a suit against the government. Although procedural due
process does provide protection for plaintiffs in suits against private
112
actors, the structure of civil litigation between private parties, by its
nature, gives more choice and autonomy to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs typically
make the initial decision with respect to a number of structural elements
of the lawsuit, including the type of court and the location of the court.
This choice, coupled with basic rules that ensure equal treatment of
parties during the litigation (that is, both parties may engage in
discovery, both parties may not participate in ex parte communication,
and so on), means that it is defendants’ due process rights that courts
more often litigate and scholars more often consider, and it is
defendants’ due process rights that are considered largely through a
constitutional lens.
Procedural justice, in contrast, is a phenomenon that can always be
discussed with respect to all parties to a dispute. Because procedural
justice perceptions help promote acceptance of and adherence to
outcomes, the procedural justice experienced by a losing party, whether
plaintiff or defendant, may be of particular concern. For our legal system
to function smoothly, a losing plaintiff should not need to pursue
procedural due process.”). But see Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
(holding that in order to have a property interest in a benefit, an individual needs to have a “legitimate
claim of entitlement to it”).
110. The Supreme Court stated in Meyer v. Nebraska that the liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution includes:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 572; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We are dealing here with . . . one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”); Chemerinsky, supra
note 87, at 565.
111. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.
112. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (noting that a
constitutionally recognized property interest is subject to due process protection).
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extralegal relief, and a losing defendant should be willing to pay a
judgment or otherwise comply with a court ruling. But procedural justice
effects are not limited to the losing party. Indeed, the procedural justice
perceptions of the winning party may be just as important as those of the
loser for purposes of satisfaction with the system and perceptions of
legitimacy. Thus, procedural justice effects are experienced by, and
important for, both plaintiffs and defendants, whether they prevail on the
merits of the case or not.
Additionally, perhaps the most interesting difference between
procedural justice effects and procedural due process requirements is
that procedural justice effects may even be felt by nonparties to any
particular dispute: other actors in the legal system with a stake in the
decisionmaking process may also experience procedural justice effects
113
that in turn affect perceptions of the legitimacy of the legal system. A
procedural justice analysis thus captures a wider range of consequences
than procedural due process may include.
Finally, although there are undoubtedly individual differences in
experiences of procedural justice, and although the philosophical
underpinnings of the legal system are important and valuable, there is a
real benefit to exploring the idea of procedural fairness in the legal
system from the subjective perspective of individual participants rather
than from the perspective of a third-party observer. A psychological
perspective suggests how participants may understand that system as
they engage with it rather than contemplate it from afar. This analysis
may indicate that while rules put in place to provide sufficient procedural
due process may appear sound from a structural point of view, subjective
perceptions about procedural fair process based on these rules may fall
114
short of our expectations and our desires. Because these subjective
perceptions likely influence our compliance with the law and our

113. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance
About Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1361, 1394 (2005)
(arguing that jury members, as citizens, may experience procedural justice effects); see also infra notes
115–21 and accompanying text.
114. One concern worth raising—although its full consideration is beyond my scope here—is to
what extent the very procedures we mandate may, in turn, shape our perceptions of what procedural
justice looks like. That is, there may be a classic chicken-and-egg problem between the structure of our
legal system and our use of particular factors (and not others) as we form subjective judgments about
procedural justice. On one hand, it may be that our innate psychological vision of fairness has led us to
form a system with protections that match this vision. On the other hand, our psychological
preferences may be shaped by the structures we have created. Interestingly, procedural justice effects
that are largely similar to the ones experienced by citizens in the United States have been found in
other countries with different legal systems and different cultural orientations. See E. Allan Lind et al.,
Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments,
73 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 767, 777 (1997) (finding similar antecedents for individuals in
United States, Germany, and Hong Kong, suggesting that there are some shared human conceptions
about fair treatment even when legal structures differ).
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opinions about the law’s legitimacy, they must be taken seriously. A
greater understanding of how individuals actually form assessments
about the fairness of the treatment they receive in the courts can only
help efforts to provide fair process to litigants and other relevant actors.
D. Whose Procedural Justice
1.

Clients Versus Lawyers

The role of lawyers has been relatively under-studied in empirical
115
procedural justice research. Studies focus largely on the perceptions of
individuals rather than of lawyers, whether or not those individuals are
116
represented by counsel. This focus makes sense because parties, not
lawyers, are most often responsible for continuing adherence to outcomes.
Additionally, empirical researchers have been more concerned with the
effects of procedural justice on the general citizenry than on the far
smaller group of attorneys involved in dispute resolution because of the
size differential between these populations and the potential for large
policy implications.
However, a close look at procedural justice in litigation suggests that
a lawyer’s role as representative, as well as a lawyer’s own perceptions of
procedural justice, may be important in thinking about litigant
assessments of procedural justice. In particular, factors that guide
individuals’ perceptions of procedural justice may be complicated by the
117
fact that individuals are represented by counsel. More specifically,
although assessments about trust and neutrality reasonably may be
formed by individual litigants, the degree to which someone feels that
she has had a voice in the litigation process and has been treated with
courtesy and respect by a judge may be hard to measure precisely in a
system where lawyers almost always speak on behalf of clients, and
judges most often interact with lawyers rather than directly with clients.

115. Some studies have included lawyer-type representation when assessing participant procedural
justice. See, e.g., Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with
Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes of Adjudication, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1531, 1535
(1978); E. Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated Resolution of
Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 643, 645 (1980); Laurens Walker et al.,
Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 295, 299
(1974). Other research has suggested that individuals who feel positive about their attorneys also
report higher procedural justice perceptions. See, e.g., Lind et al., supra note 51, at 972. But few, if any,
studies have looked carefully at the ways in which lawyer and client behavior and lawyer and client
perceptions of procedural justice are systematically intertwined.
116. But see Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 26, at 480–82 (presenting the results of a study
involving procedural justice assessments of law students in the role of attorneys in a simulated
negotiation).
117. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 381, 386 (2010);
Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do With It?,
79 Wash. U. L.Q. 787, 841 (2001).
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Studies of procedural justice in the litigation context often conflate
the voice experienced by a litigant with the extent to which a lawyer was
118
able to present the litigant’s perspective to the court. Because the
lawyer is hired to represent the client in court, this conflation makes
sense: to the degree that the lawyer has the opportunity to present the
client’s case, the client ought to feel that her case has been heard. Of
course, representation adds an extra layer that may not be fully under
the control of the judge, in that the effectiveness of voice may not
depend solely on the opportunity provided by the judge, but also on the
skill and actions of the lawyer. The procedural justice perceptions of the
client may be affected not only by the performance of the lawyer before
the judge or in the dispute context itself. Some commentators have
suggested, for instance, that the procedural justice the client experiences
in her relationship with her lawyer is important to her perceptions of
119
legitimacy, and occasionally studies have even measured procedural
justice by asking about the amount of time clients were able to spend in
120
communication with their lawyers. So, too, procedural justice as
subjectively experienced by the attorney might be passed along to the
client through the attorney’s subjective presentation of information
121
about the case and its disposition to the client. Although there are not
yet clear data demonstrating the effects of procedural justice assessments
by lawyers on clients or of the relationship between specific lawyer
behavior and client perceptions, a discussion of procedural justice in
litigation would be incomplete without an acknowledgement that both of
these perceptions may be important, may differ from one another, and
may also be dynamically interrelated.
2.

Individuals Versus Entities

In light of long-standing popular stereotypes that federal courts are
122
bastions of corporate interests and the elite, a concern about the
psychology of procedural justice in federal court may seem inapposite
because federal litigation involves so many corporate parties, for whom
the concept of procedural justice appears irrelevant. I offer two
responses to this concern. First, procedural justice effects, although
attenuated, may still be present in the corporate party context. Second,
118. See Welsh, supra note 117, at 789–90.
119. William L. F. Felstiner & Ben Pettit, Paternalism, Power, and Respect in Lawyer-Client
Relations, in Handbook of Justice Research in Law 135, 139 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton
eds., 2001).
120. Casper et al., supra note 23, at 498.
121. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 117, at 417.
122. See Michael Wells, Against an Elite Federal Judiciary: Comments on the Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 923, 925 (noting that the Federal Courts Study Committee
believes that federal courts should remain elite because their composition leads to their efficacy and to
public confidence in their decisions).
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federal court litigation may include more corporate parties than other
types of litigation, such as state court, family court, or small claims court,
but that does not mean there are not large numbers of individuals
involved in federal litigation.
On one hand, it is true that the studies in psychology about
procedural justice examine the perspective of individual disputants, not
corporate representatives; there have not been empirical studies
exploring the procedural justice perceptions of entities engaged in
dispute resolution or of the effects and boundary conditions of the
procedural justice perceptions of entities’ agents. As with the lawyerclient divide, the addition of an entity’s agent to the mix complicates the
psychological procedural justice analysis by potentially attenuating
procedural justice effects. Additionally, an entity represented by an
agent simply cannot, as a definitional matter, have any perceptions of
procedural justice; it is an entity, with no independent psychological
experience. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that an
individual representative of a corporation or other corporate form would
not experience some procedural justice effects based on her perceptions
of how fairly her organization, and her organization’s agents, were
treated by certain court procedures. However, because responsibility for
adherence to an outcome may be diffuse, or because there are many
other potential individuals in the corporation who were not directly
involved in litigation but who will also form an opinion about the
outcome, the procedural justice effects may be narrower and more
constrained.
In addition, because there are so many corporate litigants in federal
court, and because the psychology of procedural justice may be most
acutely meaningful as it applies to individual litigants, one might discount
the potential importance of procedural justice in the federal courts.
However, statistics suggest that there are still a vast number of individual
litigants in federal court. For example, in 2005, Gillian Hadfield estimated
that although ninety percent of non-prisoner and non-student-loan cases
involved at least one corporate defendant, seventy percent of plaintiffs in
123
non-prisoner and non-student-loan litigation were individuals. Of course,
prisoner and student-loan litigation always involve one individual party,
and given that there were a total of 299,512 pending cases in federal
124
court as of March 31, 2010, this suggests that a fairly large number of
individuals are involved in pending civil litigation in federal court.

123. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation:
Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases,
57 Stan. L. Rev. 1275, 1301 (2005).
124. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2010, Table C-1 U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, U.S. Cts. (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics2010.aspx.
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Thus, although procedural justice effects may be attenuated for
corporate parties, they are not impossible to imagine. Perhaps more
importantly, there are many individual litigants for whom procedural
justice effects are likely to be more profound. In fact, perceptions that
the federal courts cater to corporate interests and to the rich elite
highlight the importance of a focus on procedural justice. Perceptions of
fairness of process may be particularly critical in counteracting negative
impressions of resource-based rather than merit-based decisions and of
bias towards corporate parties.

II. Procedural Justice in Basic Federal
Rules and Procedures
Many of the rules of civil litigation reflect precepts of the
psychology of procedural justice. By conscious design, the American
legal system attempts to provide a voice for participants, mandates that
judges and lawyers act with courtesy and respect, and requires a
trustworthy and unbiased decisionmaker. If all goes according to this
design, a participant in the legal system should experience litigation as a
procedurally just process, regardless of its outcome. Indeed, some of the
very rules that could form the basis for an individual’s subjective sense
that a process is fair are the same rules that judges, lawyers, and scholars
understand to be the critical safeguards of due process. But this view is
too simplistic. Merely because one intent of the system’s design is to
foster a fair process for participants, the effect and the implementation of
the design do not automatically yield this result.
In this Part, I consider a number of basic rules of civil litigation in
light of the four factors that psychological research has suggested lead to
procedural justice judgments, as discussed above. I also consider ways in
which the rules or their application may complicate, frustrate, or fail to
foster perceptions of procedural justice. I have chosen a handful of
relatively simple but disparate rules and doctrines highlighting the
ubiquity of fairness of process considerations.
One point of clarification is in order here before I proceed:
procedural justice in psychology should not lend itself automatically to a
zero-sum analysis. That is, increased procedural justice for one party
does not naturally mean decreased procedural justice for another. Of
course, although many rules that may affect perceptions about
procedural justice apply equally to both parties (say, rules against ex
parte communication), it is true that some rules may affect one party
more than another (such as pleading rules, as I explain more fully
below). But providing more voice, more neutrality, more trustworthiness,
and more courtesy and respect to any one party does not obviously
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decrease those factors for the other party. In certain circumstances, it
may be that this zero-sum effect appears to occur, but it is by no means
126
inevitable or obvious. A psychological perspective on procedural
justice offers the potential to increase parties’ perceptions of procedural
justice without necessarily concomitantly diminishing perceptions of
procedural justice for other parties; indeed, this may be one of the
strongest positive aspects of a focus on procedural justice.
A. Notice
Consider something as fundamental as the rules surrounding the
service of a complaint. Parties have heavily litigated what will constitute
127
proper service so that notice is adequate, and the question of proper
notice is one that invokes defendants’ due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
128
heard” and has further explained that the right to be heard “has little
reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can
129
choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”
The right to a voice is critical, and must be protected by appropriate
notice requirements.
If what we really care about is the opportunity to participate, then as
long as actual notice has occurred, the courts should be satisfied. Yet
courts have placed certain limits on what kinds of behavior are permitted
in an effort to provide notice: in particular, judges balk at achieving
notice through deceptive means. As one court explained, “It is clearly
established law that where a ‘person has been induced by trickery to
come within the jurisdiction of a court for purposes of procuring service
130
of process upon such person, the service will be set aside.’” From a

125. However, dramatically increasing procedural justice for one party while keeping it constant
for another may cause the perceptions of the latter party to change. Because people often evaluate
their circumstances based on comparisons with others (a phenomenon called “relative deprivation” in
the justice literature), a level of procedural justice that initially might have appeared positively might
show to ill advantage when contrasted with another party’s heightened fair process. See Robert K.
Merton & Alice S. Kitt, Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior, in Continuities in
Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of “The American Soldier” 40, 42–48 (Robert
K. Merton & Paul F. Lazersfeld eds., 1950); 1 Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier:
Adjustment During Army Life, 126–27 (1949).
126. For a different perspective on the potential zero-sum nature of procedural rules, see Mark
Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 Ind. L.J. 645, 693 (2011) (arguing that the plaintiffs’ bar and
corporate litigants are antagonists in a zero-sum rulemaking process).
127. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,
163 (2002); Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions
v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 792 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 445 (1982).
128. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
129. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
130. Voice Sys. Mktg. Co. v. Appropriate Tech. Corp., 153 F.R.D. 117, 119 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
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procedural justice standpoint, the served-by-trickery defendant has no
complaint about voice or opportunity to be heard, but this behavior does
relate both to the trustworthiness of the decisionmaking authority and to
the treatment of the party with dignity and respect. By its very nature,
deception is untrustworthy, and an authority structure that tolerates,
condones, or even encourages parties to trick one another is not likely to
induce feelings of trust in its participants. Similarly, trickery makes a
mockery of the tricked party, which certainly does not comport with
courteous and respectful treatment. Additionally, service by trickery
sometimes may serve a substantive purpose—to gain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of her presence within the
131
forum. When a defendant is not otherwise subject to the court’s
jurisdiction and is tricked into presence in the forum, which then results
in a finding of personal jurisdiction, the defendant may form an opinion
that the decisionmaker is acting in nonneutral way, with a bias towards
citizens of the home state. Thus, preventing trickery helps to foster a
defendant’s belief that the decisionmaker is neutral and trustworthy.
On the other hand, federal courts do not allow a defendant who has
been evasive of service, or has herself resorted to trickery, to prevail on a
claim of improper notice. As one district court recently noted,
Where the defendant receives actual notice and the plaintiff makes a
good faith effort to serve the defendant pursuant to the federal rule,
service of process has been effective. Good faith efforts at service are
effective particularly where the defendant has engaged in evasion,
132
deception, or trickery to avoid being served.

Service of process is “not a game of hide and seek,” and a defendant
“cannot claim that the [c]ourt has no authority to act when he has
133
willfully evaded the service of process.”
Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which allows for service
by mail if personal service is waived, largely eliminates the potential for
the shenanigans of service that had been common in earlier times. The
request for waiver of personal service contained in Rule 4(d)(1), and the
134
resulting drawbacks for failure to waive enumerated in Rule 4(d)(2),
suggest that notice in federal court is to be streamlined and is not a fertile

(quoting K Mart Corp. v. Gen-Star Indus., 110 F.R.D. 310, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1986)).
131. Presence in a forum is a traditional basis for personal jurisdiction. Burnham v. Superior Ct.,
495 U.S. 604, 605 (1990).
132. Conwill v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., No. 09-4365, 2010 WL 2773239, at *3 (E.D. La. July 13,
2010) (citation omitted).
133. Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055, 2001 WL 83388, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 25, 2001).
134. The rule provides that if a defendant “fails, without good cause, to sign and return a waiver
requested by a plaintiff . . . the court must impose on the defendant: (A) the expenses later incurred in
making service; and (B) the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, of any motion required to
collect those service expenses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2).
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field for antics, tricks, or deception. The Advisory Committee Notes on
Rule 4 suggest that the rule will be helpful in dealing with “furtive”
defendants, and that one goal of the new rule is “to foster cooperation
135
among adversaries and counsel.”
By making service of process
available by mail, Rule 4 makes service of process easier and limits the
situations in which a plaintiff would be tempted to resort to trickery or
deception, or a defendant would benefit from doing so. In the process,
the rule is likely to provide positive perceptions of procedural justice for
plaintiffs, who see their opportunities for voice increase and see the
potential for discourtesy diminish. The rule similarly decreases
opportunities for disrespectful behavior towards the defendant but does
not provide defendants with a similar increased opportunity for voice.
B. Complaints and Other Pleadings
Generally speaking, the adversary system, as contrasted with other
types of dispute resolution systems such as the inquisitorial model, relies
136
heavily on the parties having voice in the process. In considering the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is clear that affording the parties a
sense of their own voice in litigation is critical, and that this voice begins
with the pleading process. The plaintiff, as the party bringing a claim, has
an easy first opportunity to have a voice in the process—the plaintiff
brings the action, after all, and must state the case in a pleading that
describes the grounds for the action both factually and legally. The back
and forth of the pleading system (complaint, answer, reply, ability to
amend the complaint), and the motion system (motion, response, reply)
provide all litigants with opportunities to express their views and have
them considered by the decisionmaker. Although the system fairly rigidly
controls the form and manner of expression, parties are nonetheless
provided ample opportunity to express to the court their views and their
version of the facts.
The content of the complaint itself also speaks to a concern with the
137
opportunity for voice. Typical pleading rules require that a statement
138
of the claim show that the pleader is entitled to relief. The complaint
must give the defendant ample notice and understanding of the nature of
the claims brought, which typically means that the plaintiff must provide

135. Fed R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee’s notes; see also Kent Sinclair, Service of Process:
Amended Rule 4 and the Presumption of Jurisdiction, 14 Rev. Litig. 159, 172 (1994).
136. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 1, at 121 (finding that parties prefer an adversarial process to
an inquisitorial process, largely because of the perception that an adversary system provides greater
voice and thus procedural justice).
137. Similarly, ex parte communication is prohibited because it would allow one party to express
its views to the decisionmaker without allowing the other party a similar opportunity to voice her
response. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.5(b) (2010).
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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a statement of the facts underlying the complaint. This requirement is
important because it allows the defendant the opportunity to respond to
the right facts and to have an appropriate voice in the action. It would be
difficult for the defendant to feel that she had a voice in the proceeding if
the defendant did not have any idea what the basis for the specific claim
against her was, and was forced to respond with a general denial of
140
wrongdoing rather than a specific rebuttal of the plaintiff’s assertions.
The recent decisions by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
141
142
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal have heightened requirements for
143
what must be included in a plaintiff’s complaint. Together, the two
opinions call for the plaintiff’s complaint to provide more information
about the basis of her claim and, on a defendant’s motion to dismiss,
subject the information provided in the complaint to a plausibility or
144
common-sense test. These decisions are likely to have an effect on the
procedural justice perceptions of both parties. From the plaintiff’s
perspective, the restrictions on pleading—even though they require a
pleader to say more—may decrease perceptions of procedural justice.
Pleaders often are not fully aware of the facts in a dispute, especially the
facts most supportive of their allegations. Although requiring plaintiffs to
say more about these facts may look, at first blush, like an opportunity to
increase participation, in fact this requirement dampens participation
because it raises the bar to have one’s case heard before the court at all.
By raising this level, these two decisions will cause some cases not to be
heard, thereby completely depriving potential plaintiffs of their voice.
From the defense perspective, in contrast, these decisions are likely to

139. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“To the contrary, all the rules require is a ‘sweet
and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.”).
140. Of course, another reason that this is required is in order to give the judge the right
information to decide the case.
141. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
142. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
143. Legal scholars have largely understood Twombly and Iqbal as dramatically changing the
standard for pleading. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 849, 850 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 518 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal
and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 185, 188 (2010); Suja A.
Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly,
14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 15, 17 (2010). But not everyone agrees that the standard has changed so
dramatically. Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1298 (2010) (“This
Article challenges the conventional wisdom that Iqbal and Twombly run roughshod over a halfcentury’s worth of accumulated wisdom on pleading standards.”). Empirical data is not conclusive on
how these decisions have affected actual court practice. See Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1811, 1844–45 (2008).
144. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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increase perceptions of procedural justice based on increased voice:
requiring the plaintiff to say more means that the defendant has more
information to which to respond, so that her participation in preparing an
answer or other responsive pleading is more meaningful.
The new standards in Twombly and Iqbal raise concerns along the
lines of the other procedural justice factors, as well. The old standard, set
forth in Conley v. Gibson, famously required the deciding court not to
dismiss a complaint “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
145
relief.” I do not suggest here that the Conley standard was pure
formalism and that no judicial discretion or bias could creep in, but that
standard was less blatantly susceptible to judicial discretion and
opportunity for bias. In contrast, the Iqbal Court expressly asks the
deciding judge to use his or her own world view in evaluating the
146
sufficiency of the complaint. As the Court explains, “Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
147
judicial experience and common sense.” This individualization of the
standard for decisions is likely to affect participants’ judgments about
both trust and neutrality. The common sense (and past experience) of an
individual judge may suggest, for example, that a productive employee is
likely to be promoted, regardless of race or gender, while the common
sense and past experience of a plaintiff in a discrimination case may be
quite different. This difference in perceptions is likely to lead the plaintiff
to infer that the judge is not neutral and perhaps not trustworthy. In
contrast, when the judge’s common sense and experience are similar to
that of the defendant, the defendant’s perceptions of neutrality and
trustworthiness may increase. When the judge’s common sense comports
with the plaintiff’s, the situation will be reversed. Because the change in
standard appears likely to result in more dismissals of complaints, Iqbal
and Twombly seem poised to work a change for the worse in plaintiffs’
procedural justice perspectives and for the better in defendants’
procedural justice perspectives.
C. Discovery
Discovery, too, is a mechanism that is expressly designed to enable
participation and voice. Several scholars have considered discovery from
148
a procedural due process perspective. Just as an opportunity to be
145. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
146. 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 505,
509–10 (2000); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 Duke L.J. 561, 563
(2001).
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heard is worthless without notice, so, too, an opportunity to go to court is
worthless without relevant evidence. Discovery provides both parties
with the opportunity for meaningful participation by allowing them
access to information that will form the basis for their presentation to the
court. Imagine a system in which discovery was not permitted: the
opportunity for participation would be severely hampered. The focus on
whether due process has been provided by discovery rules, paired with
an instrumental motive for due process, has framed the debate over
discovery rules as largely about efficiency. Accuracy is balanced against
cost, and when discovery is too broad, it may be unreasonably inefficient.
On the other hand, when discovery is too narrow, there is not only a risk
of substantive inaccuracy but also a very real concern that individuals
may not experience the litigation process as procedurally just. When
discovery is so restricted that it prevents a party from identifying and
receiving important material, it in turn prevents a party from adequately
presenting her case.
Restrictive discovery rules, taken in tandem with the heightened
149
pleading requirements discussed above, pose a serious threat to
individuals’ perceptions about their opportunity for voice in litigation,
and, in turn, their procedural justice judgments. Because individuals may
lack the data to support their case, notice pleading in conjunction with
liberal discovery was a system well poised to offer voice to plaintiffs. But
when an individual must reach a heightened standard of pleading and has
little opportunity to gather potentially hidden information, opportunities
for voice may be diminished. This problem is compounded in cases
alleging discriminatory behavior because in such a case it is particularly
difficult to have all the facts about the other side’s behavior. When a
potential plaintiff believes she has been discriminated against, the
situation is rife for concerns about trust and neutrality, and the very
decision not to afford voice, or to severely limit voice, may itself lead to
150
perceptions of bias and untrustworthiness.
Discovery is not without costs, however, and while the voice
benefits of liberal discovery are obvious, there are also procedural justice
concerns that may cut the other direction. One party may overwhelm the
other with discovery requests, or “over comply” in producing responses
149. A number of scholars have considered the connection between restrictive discovery rules and
the new pleading requirements. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How
Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 65, 68 (2010).
150. Psychological research has indicated that members of stigmatized social groups may
sometimes have increased sensitivity to status-based rejection. See Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton et al.,
Sensitivity to Status-Based Rejection: Implications for African American Students’ College Experience,
83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 896, 913 (2002). Heightened sensitivity to status issues may suggest
that in discrimination cases status concerns are more salient and that these plaintiffs are poised to
perceive disrespect and discourtesy or other dignitary insults.
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to discovery requests in order to swamp the other party with documents.
Additionally, intrusive questioning during discovery may lead not to the
perception of increased voice on the part of the respondent but instead
to embarrassment and oppression. When these events happen,
perceptions of procedural justice may be negatively affected because
these behaviors appear discourteous and disrespectful. Although courts
may sometimes step in to manage discovery and prevent these effects,
this kind of discovery dispute rarely rises to the level of a procedural due
process concern, and discovery is largely self-policing by the parties.
D. Impartial Decisionmaker
An impartial decisionmaker is a key focus of procedural due process
151
analysis in the federal courts. It is not an exaggeration to say that the
amount of academic attention given to the topic of judicial impartiality is
152
“staggering.” The federal judicial system is designed to afford litigants
an impartial decisionmaker. One of the primary means by which the
federal system attempts to accomplish this goal is giving federal judges
153
lifetime tenure so that they are free to decide without the bias that
might creep in if they had to answer to powerful interest groups or an
154
electorate. Lifetime tenure, however, does not completely insulate
federal judges from bias related to the taking and keeping of office:
becoming a federal judge involves a networking process among
155
legislators and other benefactors, and the appointments process itself

151. See, e.g., Redish & Marshall, supra note 88, at 484.
152. Amy B. Atchison et al., Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: A Selected
Bibliography, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1999) (“[T]opics of judicial independence and judicial
accountability have been written about extensively, and the number of possibly relevant writings from
the past forty years is staggering.”).
153. State judges, in contrast, tend to be elected to fixed terms. Even when terms are quite lengthy,
preventing judges from being unseated immediately following an unpopular decision, there
nonetheless typically comes a time when these judges must campaign for reelection. Such campaigns
may be expensive and require outside funding that may suggest a lack of ensuing impartiality towards
the contributors. Mark Spottswood, Free Speech and Due Process Problems in the Regulation and
Financing of Judicial Election Campaigns, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 331, 332 (2007) (“The American Bar
Association, which has long opposed judicial elections, has promulgated model regulations of judicial
conduct on several occasions; the most recent version is the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, first
published in 1990. The Model Code seeks, among other goals, to control the bias that flows from the
financial relationship between judges and their campaign contributors. One provision of the Model
Code, known throughout this Comment as the Solicitation Canon, bans judges or judicial candidates
from personally soliciting donations to their campaigns.” (citations omitted)).
154. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from the
Federalist Papers, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1669, 1680 (1988) (describing benefits of long judicial tenure);
Maura Anne Schoshinski, Note, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary: An
Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 839, 840 (1994).
155. See Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 699, 710–
11 (1995) (arguing that appointment of federal judges yields benefactors that can threaten
impartiality).
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has been subject to criticism for its potential to threaten judicial
156
independence.
Once in office, federal judges are subject to rules that expressly
attempt to limit their adjudicative capacity to situations in which they
themselves do not have a particular interest. The federal system strives
for transparency so that parties have enough data to conclude that the
decisionmaking authorities and process are impartial. Judges are
required to act transparently and to state publicly their financial
157
holdings. Additionally, judges are required to recuse themselves from
decisionmaking when they have an interest in the subject matter of the
158
159
case. Courts note that this helps reduce the probability of bias.
Recusal is important because it prevents even an “appearance of
160
impropriety.” Even when there is no technical impropriety, courts have
suggested that cases coming close to the line should be decided in favor
of recusal, because it is crucial that courts appear to be neutral, bias-free
161
decisionmakers. Even an appearance of biased decisionmaking might
be enough to shake citizen trust in the court system, and so must be
162
avoided.
In reality, of course, bias is more complicated. What is a neutral
and unbiased decisionmaker? Robust research in political science has
suggested that the ideology of a judge (or of those in control of the
163
judicial appointment process) influences judicial decisionmaking. And
156. See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, The Politics of Picking Judges, 6 J.L. & Pol. 35, 39 (1989); Randall
R. Rader, The Independence of the Judiciary: A Critical Aspect of the Confirmation Process, 77 Ky L.J.
767, 775–77 (1989).
157. These disclosures are mandated by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 §§ 101–111,
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–111 (2006 & Supp. 2009), and are available to the public on the Judicial Watch
website. Judicial Financial Disclosure, Jud. Watch, http://www.judicialwatch.org/judicial-financialdisclosure (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) expressly provides for recusal when a judge’s “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”
159. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no
man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an
interest in the outcome.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Fazio, 487 F.3d 646, 653 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he key ingredient in a
section 455(a) recusal case is avoidance of the appearance of impropriety, as judged by whether the
average person on the street might question the judge’s impartiality.”).
161. Id.; see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009); Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988) (“The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote
confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.”);
Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1977) (“[A]ppearance of impartiality
is virtually as important as the fact of impartiality.”).
162. See sources cited supra note 161.
163. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We
Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 213 (2009); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial
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in any given case, judgments about neutrality and absence of bias for a
particular judge are, perhaps ironically, themselves subject to bias. This
issue was notably considered over three decades ago when parties sought
Judge Constance Baker Motley’s recusal in a gender discrimination
164
case. Judge Motley, the first African American female judge ever
appointed to the federal bench, noted,
[I]f background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition,
sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this
case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that all of them were
attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law firm or public service
165
backgrounds.

More recently, the same argument has been leveled at Judge
Vaughn Walker in the consideration of the California ban on same-sex
166
marriage, based on Judge Walker’s own sexual orientation. And such
concerns are not limited to cases involving discrimination. Justice
Antonin Scalia’s famous 2004 refusal to recuse himself when one party in
a case, Vice President Dick Cheney, had recently been his companion on
167
a duck-hunting trip also sparked criticism. From a procedural justice
perspective, rules about neutrality and unbiased decisionmakers may
provide some protection, but individual actors and interested parties to
the litigation have individual differences with respect to when they
believe that a decisionmaker is truly impartial. Impartiality is, in many
instances, in the eye of the beholder. In some situations, it may be
difficult, if not impossible, to find a decisionmaker whom all parties
perceive as neutral and bias-free.
E. Rules About Conduct
Courts also make an express effort, at least on the books, to hew to
a norm of civility and politeness. While there is no constitutional
168
guarantee that judges behave nicely in their dealings with litigants,

Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 Just. Sys. J. 219, 243 (1999). But see Harry T.
Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1370 (1998).
164. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
165. Id. at 4.
166. See Aliyah Shahid, Judge Vaughn Walker’s Sexual Orientation Sparks Ire over Fairness on
Prop 8, Same-Sex Marriage Case, N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 6, 2010, http://articles.nydailynews.com/
2010-08-06/news/27071905_1_gay-marriage-marriage-ban-marriage-case; see also MacDraw, Inc. v.
The CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 447, 447–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 138 F.3d 33 (2d Cir.
1998) (disciplining counsel for undignified and discourteous conduct when asking for recusal because
counsel were involved in a separate case involving bias against the Asian American community and
thought Judge Chin had prejudged the instant case).
167. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 913–14 (2004).
168. Alas, whatever the scope of the “good behavior” provision in the Constitution may be, U.S.
Const. art. III, § 1, it does not appear to encompass basic civility and good manners. For a lively debate
about the actual meaning of the provision, see James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1227, 1227–30 (2007); Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge,
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courtesy and respect are expressly called for by Canon 3(A)(3) of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which provides:
A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. A judge should require similar conduct of
those subject to the judge’s control, including lawyers to the extent
169
consistent with their role in the adversary process.

Although the Code of Conduct does not carry the force of law and
“cannot be the standard for judicial discipline,” it puts forth aspirational
goals for the judiciary that courts seem to take seriously, at least on
170
occasion. For instance, the Seventh Circuit noted, “It is a hallmark of
the American system of justice that anyone who appears as a litigant in
171
an American courtroom is treated with dignity and respect.” And in an
opinion describing the gross discourtesy and partiality of an immigration
judge, the Third Circuit indicated that the treatment of defendants with
courtesy, respect, and dignity is inextricably tied up with perceptions of
neutrality and impartiality, and together these factors help to dictate
172
whether or not a party has received due process. The court explained:
We began with a reminder of the “dignity,” “respect,” “courtesy,” and
“fairness,” that a litigant should expect to receive in an American
courtroom. These words . . . are not merely advisory or aspirational.
Indeed, although [respondent] has no constitutional right to asylum, he
was entitled, as a matter of due process, to a full and fair hearing on his
173
application.

The court displays an intuitive grasp of the fact that discourtesy and
174
disrespect can lead to a perception of unfair process. In other, less
formal but nonetheless entrenched ways, court practices may reinforce a
norm of courtesy and respect. For example, the Fourth Circuit has a
tradition in which “judges come down from the bench following
argument to shake hands with counsel and thank them for their
175
advocacy.”

116 Yale L.J. 72, 88–89 (2006); Martin H. Redish, Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the
Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 116 Yale L.J. 139, 141–43 (2006).
169. Code of Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3(A)(3) (2011).
170. In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1995) (“While perhaps a
judge’s rudeness could be so egregious as to constitute misconduct under the [relevant law], the
incidents at issue here do not rise to that level.”).
171. Iliev v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 127 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1997).
172. Cham v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 690–91 (3d Cir. 2006).
173. Id.
174. There are a number of state court cases authorizing disciplinary action against judges who
repeatedly behave in discourteous ways towards litigants. See, e.g., In re Wood, 720 So. 2d 506, 506
(Fla. 1998); In re Kellam, 503 A.2d 1308, 1311 (Me. 1986); In re O’Dea, 622 A.2d 507, 515 (Vt. 1993).
But see In re Hocking, 546 N.W.2d 234, 245 (Mich. 1996).
175. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Oral Argument Procedures (2011).

Hollander-Blumoff_22 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

160

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:33 PM

[Vol. 63:127

Courts are also tasked with the oversight of attorney behavior.
Attorneys are subject to relevant disciplinary rules in their jurisdiction.
Although the current ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
summarily prohibit lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct intended to
176
disrupt a tribunal,” prior versions of the Model Rules were far more
explicit. The Ethical Canons of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility formerly called for an attorney to be “respectful,
courteous, and above-board in his relations with a judge or hearing
177
officer before whom he appears,” as well as “courteous to opposing
178
counsel.” Similarly, the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility forbade a lawyer to “[f]ail to comply with
179
known local customs of courtesy” or “[e]ngage in undignified or
180
discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal.” Numerous
states govern the conduct of their attorneys through rules that still call
181
for courteous behavior. Although attorneys are not decisionmakers
themselves, they are nonetheless in a position of some status in a court
proceeding and their behavior may affect the procedural justice
perceptions both of the other attorneys involved in the action and of the
litigants themselves.
Courts have expressly made the connection between the behavior of
attorneys and the legitimacy of the proceedings: the Supreme Court long
ago defended a judge’s authority to sanction a lawyer’s courtroom
behavior on the grounds that “it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with
182
the bench should be preserved.” Attorneys have been faced with
suspension and the threat of disbarment for disrespectful behavior in
183
court.

176. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.5(d) (2009).
177. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 7-36 (1980).
178. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 7-38 (1980).
179. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(5) (1980).
180. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(6) (1980). Additionally, the previous
Model Disciplinary Rules expressly stated that a lawyer does not violate the rules mandating zealous
advocacy “by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.”
Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980).
181. See, e.g., N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 3.3(f)(2) (2011) (setting forth disciplinary rules that
largely track the earlier version of the ABA Model Rules); Mich. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 6.5
(2011) (“A lawyer shall treat with courtesy and respect all persons involved in the legal process.”).
182. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530 (1824). This authority is not limited to the federal judiciary.
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court, highlighting the importance of the courts having “the confidence
and respect of the people,” suggested that “[u]njust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts
and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted.” Ex
rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Metzen, 125 N.E. 734, 735 (Ill. 1919).
183. See, e.g., In re Zeno, 517 F. Supp. 2d 591, 600 (D.P.R. 2007), aff’d, 504 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2007)
(holding that an attorney could be suspended for three months because of “disrespectful” behavior
towards a judge); In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706–07 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that an attorney could be
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Of course, not all unpleasantly discourteous conduct is sanctionable.
For instance, the Supreme Court offered this analysis in one case:
[T]he tone of a [petitioner’s letter] . . . can be read as ill-mannered. All
persons involved in the judicial process—judges, litigants, witnesses,
and court officers—owe a duty of courtesy to all other participants.
The necessity for civility in the inherently contentious setting of the
adversary process suggests that members of the bar cast criticisms of
the system in a professional and civil tone. However, even assuming
that the letter exhibited an unlawyerlike rudeness, a single incident of
rudeness or lack of professional courtesy—in this context—does not
support a finding of contemptuous or contumacious conduct, or a
finding that a lawyer is “not presently fit to practice law in the federal
courts.” Nor does it rise to the level of “conduct unbecoming a member
184
of the bar” warranting suspension from practice.

Although courteous behavior does not always occur, and
discourteous behavior does not always bring forth sanctions from the
governing court, nonetheless it is clear that the federal courts have an
aspirational norm of respectful and courteous behavior for both lawyers
and judges. Although procedural due process rarely formally considers
questions of courtesy and respect, psychological research suggests that
meeting this aspirational norm will help to foster perceptions of
procedural justice and, in turn, legitimacy.

III. Procedural Justice in Federal Court Doctrines
From before the time of the Constitutional Convention, Americans
have disagreed as to the appropriate relationship between the states and
185
the federal government. The substantive allocation of decisionmaking
186
between the federal and state courts is, of course, extremely important.
But the procedural mechanisms for determining that allocation may also
have the potential to affect overall satisfaction with the division and the
legitimacy of the federal system vis-à-vis the states. In this section, I
examine, through the lens of procedural justice in psychology, two
doctrines—diversity jurisdiction and federal court abstention—that
implicate the appropriate scope of federal court authority as well as the
division of judicial business between the federal and state court systems.
I first explain to whom I will extend this analysis, and then consider

disbarred for making an “unquestionably undignified, discourteous, and degrading” complaint about a
judge).
184. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 646–47 (1985) (citations omitted).
185. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between
Federal and State Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211, 1213 (2004) (“Disagreement over jurisdictional
allocation, with us since the framing of the Constitution, remains acute.”).
186. For a comprehensive examination of the “multilevel tensions” between the state and federal
governments, particularly with respect to federal courts and state courts, see Martin H. Redish,
Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 1 (1980).
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potential assessments of procedural justice in the context of diversity
187
jurisdiction and abstention doctrine.
A. Whose Procedural Justice, Redux
Both diversity and abstention affect individual litigants, and so I
begin with the most visible analysis, examining the procedural justice
implications of these doctrines on the involved parties. I then turn to a
less obvious procedural justice analysis. Specifically, instead of imagining
the perceptions of justice merely among the litigants, I also consider the
procedural justice perceptions among the structural actors in the
system—the state and federal judges before whom the cases are heard, as
well as any number of other interested parties (state and federal
legislators, executives, and ordinary citizens) to the division of business
between the court systems.
Judges most certainly are not parties asking an authority to make a
decision about their own personal dispute; they are relatively
autonomous individuals who have working relationships with one another.
While this relationship may not be personal, each judge’s actions may
influence other judges both within their own judicial system and within
other systems. Judges make decisions about intersystem disputes over
who will hear the substance of a case. The judicial system is a
decisionmaker and a societal institution to litigants, but is workplace and
societal institution to its judges. There is a robust literature on procedural
justice within the organizational context, and this literature suggests that
individuals care about fair process within the workplace and other
organizational structures.
Research on procedural justice in the workplace has repeatedly
demonstrated that individuals care deeply about the fairness of process
for decisionmaking in the workplace, separate and apart from how fair or
188
how favorable their outcomes may be. In particular, procedural justice
concerns “loom larger” than distributive justice issues when individuals
in the workplace are considering their commitment to a system and to
189
trust in its authority. It is widely suggested that federal judges are
underpaid relative to the salary they could command in the private
187. These two doctrines by no means represent the limits of areas in which there is a potential
conflict between the scope of federal and state power. An extensive literature addresses these conflicts
in a host of areas. See generally Friedman, supra note 185; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1954); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105 (1977); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191 (2007); Martin H.
Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory
of Judicial Federalism, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 71 (1998); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:
“Actual” Conflicts, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1743 (1992).
188. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
189. Folger & Konovsky, supra note 28, at 125–26.
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190

sector,
meaning that judges are already largely self-selected as
individuals who are not motivated solely by instrumental personal gains
such as monetary compensation. Thus, issues of system fairness may
already be of more critical importance to the judiciary than to other
workers.
I suggest here that thinking about judges as individuals embedded in
a judicial workplace—which can be writ small (courthouse) or large
(legal system as a whole)—is a valuable endeavor that can offer insight
about how judges themselves will understand the legal system. Beyond
the workplace context, too, judges are also citizens engaged in disputes
about the appropriate scope of their own power and influence. To the
extent that procedural justice effects have been found in a wide array of
contexts, including ones in which there is no third-party decisionmaker
and ones in which the free market governs, it is not unreasonable to
suggest that judges may be subject to procedural justice effects based on
their own experiences within the legal system. To the extent that
procedural justice enhances legitimacy and adherence to the law,
enhancing procedural justice among members of the judiciary can only
yield positive effects.
So, too, legislators who have enacted laws, or executives who are
charged with the laws’ enforcement, have a stake in whether the laws are
fully considered by a judicial body and in which judicial body has that
opportunity. A legislator whose handiwork may be considered by either
a state or a federal judge for its constitutional validity may have a strong
interest in the outcome of that decision. To that extent, such a legislator
is, in a way, subject to a decisionmaking process and may evaluate that
process for its procedural justice. However, there is not yet empirical
research that even begins to explore procedural justice effects on the part
of the judiciary, legislators, and executives. For that reason, this analysis
is theoretical and speculative, rather than grounded in empirical data.
Even so, the analysis relies on the robust framework for the psychology
of procedural justice developed over the past three and a half decades.
B. Diversity Jurisdiction
Scholars have quite often considered jurisdiction, generally speaking,
191
from a due process perspective. Personal jurisdiction doctrine, in fact, is

190. See, e.g., John W. Dean, Underpaid and Overworked: The National Disgrace of
Undercompensating Federal Judges, While Allowing Their Workload to Balloon, FindLaw (Nov. 3,
2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20061103.html.
191. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction,
60 Wash. U. L.Q. 1291, 1294 (1983); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”:
A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455, 471
(2004); Martin Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1132 (1981).
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based almost completely on tests that are designed to define due process
for out-of-state defendants. Subject matter jurisdiction, in contrast, is not
immediately and obviously susceptible to a due process analysis. At first
glance, it may not seem that subject matter jurisdiction—that is, the
division of judicial business between the state and federal court
systems—relates in any way to procedural justice concerns. When the
division is straightforward, with state courts considering state law
questions and federal courts considering federal law questions, the
importance of procedural justice may not be obvious. But when both
state and federal courts are available to consider state law questions—as
192
is the case under the aegis of diversity jurisdiction —there may be a
tension surrounding the distribution of those questions to the
appropriate authority, which raises procedural justice concerns.
Although scholars disagree on the rationale behind diversity
jurisdiction, most theorists suggest that it was meant to protect against
some type of bias. The most popular theory holds that diversity
jurisdiction mitigates bias against out-of-state defendants—an area in
which the procedural due process requirement of an impartial
decisionmaker and procedural justice’s insistence on a neutral and
trustworthy decisionmaker converge. Chief Justice John Marshall
described diversity jurisdiction in the following way:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of
every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either
entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence
the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established
national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and
193
a citizen, or between citizens of different states.

Judge Henry Friendly, however, rejected the argument that diversity
jurisdiction was created because state courts would be biased against outof-state citizens, instead suggesting that state courts would be biased

192. The Constitution specifically authorizes federal courts to take jurisdiction of suits between
citizens of different states. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) codifies
diversity jurisdiction and sets a threshold for the amount in controversy in such cases at $75,000.
193. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (1 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). The actual existence of this bias
has long been debated. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,
41 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 493 (1928) (“[S]uch information . . . entirely fails to show the existence of
prejudice on the part of the state judges.”). However, survey data has suggested that there is a
widespread—but not universal—perception of such prejudice by lawyers. See, e.g., Kristin Bumiller,
Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implications for Reform, 15 Law and
Soc’y Rev. 749, 759–60 (1980–1981) (finding that lawyers in rural areas perceived bias in local courts);
Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 369, 380 (1992) (finding that some lawyers perceived local
bias).
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against interstate commerce and business, and that such bias would be
194
more likely to originate in the legislature.
In either event, the apparent genesis for diversity jurisdiction was
some fear of a decisionmaker who was not neutral and could not be
trusted. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that diversity jurisdiction
succeeds in its efforts to provide a more impartial decisionmaker for
cases involving the citizens of two different states. While some
commentators are strong advocates for the benefits of diversity
jurisdiction with respect to impartiality and neutrality, others argue that
195
diversity jurisdiction instead perpetrates bias.
How does diversity jurisdiction appear, in procedural justice terms,
to litigants themselves? The parties may agree on a suitable forum, but
often do not. When a case involving citizens of different states is brought
in state court, an out-of-state defendant may remove the case to federal
196
court. In this situation, although the traditional rule is to allow a
197
plaintiff’s choice of her home forum to govern, the plaintiff is no longer
allowed to be heard in her chosen forum as between state and federal
court. Not only may the plaintiff believe that she has traded her chosen
decisionmaker for one less neutral and unbiased, but this shift may also
decrease the plaintiff’s sense of voice. Additionally, procedures for
removal may not be particularly suited to fostering a plaintiff’s subjective
perceptions of voice, because a defendant accomplishes removal simply
by filing a notice of removal in the federal court. Once the petition is
198
filed, the state court no longer has jurisdiction over the case. There is
no opportunity during this process to object to the removal petition. It is
only after removal has been effectuated that a party can voice her
objections to the change in court system by moving to remand the case to
199
the state court.
Even though the federal system does eventually allow a plaintiff to
voice her objections to the federal court taking jurisdiction over the case,
and even though the federal court system’s own rules will provide the
200
opportunity for the plaintiff’s case to be heard, the plaintiff nonetheless
194. Friendly, supra note 193, at 495. In the world before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73
(1938), of course, federal courts sitting in diversity could use federal common law to protect businesses
and did not need to apply the law of the state in which the court sat. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1,
4 (1842).
195. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 119, 131
(2003).
196. This assumes, of course, that the case meets the amount in controversy requirement. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (2006).
197. Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (“Where there are
only two parties to a dispute, there is good reason why it should be tried in the plaintiff’s home forum
if that has been his choice.”).
198. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 359 (5th ed. 2007).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2006).
200. See supra Part II.A.
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may experience diminished procedural justice, first because her
201
opportunity to speak in her chosen forum was thwarted, and second
because she had little voice in the moment of transition between court
systems. Additionally, the plaintiff who initially chose a state court forum
may believe that the state court judge is more trustworthy, or more
impartial, than a federal court judge, and this diminishment in trust or
belief of impartiality may affect her assessments of procedural justice. Of
course, the plaintiff may believe positively that a state court judge is not
impartial, and thus her assessments of procedural justice might increase
when the case is removed to a federal court. In any event, though, the
switch from a biased to an unbiased judge should not have any negative
consequences for procedural justice assessments.
Similarly, a defendant sued in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction and who would have preferred to be in state court may
experience diminished procedural justice because she may believe the
federal decisionmaker is biased. Again, if instead she believes that the
state court judge is biased but that the federal judge is unbiased, there
should be no corresponding drop in procedural justice. This defendant,
unlike the plaintiff above, is not likely to experience a diminishment in
perceptions of voice and opportunity to be heard. Because the defendant
did not actually ever have a choice of courts and was not removed from
one court to another, this defendant’s status quo is the federal court.
Whereas the plaintiff described above experiences a potential drop in
202
voice, the defendant here has no such comparison to make.
From the standpoint of the federal judge, voice and an opportunity
to be heard are increased when the court exercises diversity jurisdiction:
the federal judge adds to her opportunities to pronounce judgment on a
variety of issues. From the state court judge’s viewpoint, in contrast, this
type of jurisdiction removes an opportunity for voice that may be quite
important. Diversity cases, by definition, are not about matters of federal
substantive law. Therefore, federal judges in diversity cases are called
203
upon to apply and interpret state law. Sometimes these questions of
state law may be complicated or may be issues of first impression.

201. Because individuals do not evaluate situations from a neutral reference point, but rather from
the perspective of losses or gains, even when the federal court might otherwise have been perceived as
trustworthy, neutral, or voice-providing, the loss of the plaintiff’s original forum may suggest to the
plaintiff that lower degrees of these factors will be found in the new forum. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 263
(1979). Although there is no research on the effect of voice in the procedural justice context and its
relationship to status quo bias and endowment effects, it nonetheless seems reasonable that a person
whose broader opportunity for expression is curtailed will feel that her voice has been diminished,
even if the curtailment results in a level of voice that she might have found perfectly acceptable had it
been the first option offered.
202. Id.
203. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938).
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Scholars have suggested that state courts may be the most appropriate
arbiter of state law (just as federal courts may be the most appropriate
204
arbiters of federal law). State court judges likely feel that they are quite
qualified to rule on questions of state law, and federal court judges
“stealing” these questions away from them may be an affront to their
205
opportunity to be heard.
There are two ways in which federal courts have tried to ameliorate
the tension inherent in the federal judiciary interpreting state law. First,
although the general rule is that federal courts must take jurisdiction in
206
diversity cases even when state law is unclear, some federal courts have
abstained from hearing these cases. Such abstention, based on the rule
set forth in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, is
appropriate only in special circumstances, such as where there is unclear
state law and the doctrine at issue is “intimately involved with [the
207
state’s] sovereign prerogative.” Abstention inherently is a doctrine
208
about both the comity and the friction between two sovereign systems.
Some scholars have criticized the abdication of federal jurisdiction in
these cases, arguing that abstention frustrates the very purpose of
209
diversity jurisdiction in providing a “neutral” federal forum.
Abstention in this setting has the potential to deprive individual litigants

204. As Martin Redish has explained,
[I]t makes practical sense for a sovereign’s courts to have primary responsibility for
adjudication of that sovereign’s law. . . . [B]oth common sense and practical experience
dictate that a court’s primary duties will concern the development of the law of its own
sovereign. Not surprisingly, a court’s level of expertise in and familiarity with a sovereign’s
body of law will be in direct proportion to the amount of time it devotes to interpretation of
that law. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to believe that courts of a sovereign will likely be
more sensitive and sympathetic to the interests of that sovereign, if only because of the
obvious factor of sovereign allegiance. Thus, there are good reasons for a sovereign to
prefer that its own courts have primary responsibility for the protection of that sovereign’s
interests and for the evolution of its body of law.
Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts:
Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 Va. L. Rev. 1769, 1774 (1992).
205. Issues related to procedural justice have been discussed in the context of institutional players
rather than of individual litigants. See, e.g., Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921, 1927 (2003)
(arguing for the utility of institutional dignity).
206. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1943).
207. 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (holding that a case involving unclear state law and eminent domain
was appropriate for federal court abstention in a diversity action); see also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S.
Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (holding that the issue of water resources was of vital concern to
the New Mexico state government and thus the case was appropriate for abstention).
208. James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine,
46 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1053 (1994).
209. See, e.g., Charles L. Gowen & William H. Izlar, Jr., Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of
Citizenship Litigation, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 194, 213–14 (1964); Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An
Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction and Abstention with Recommendation for Legislative Action,
1990 BYU L. Rev 321, 372.
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(most acutely, plaintiffs) of their opportunity to be heard, as well as to
diminish perceptions of neutrality and trust in decisionmaking for the
party who chose the federal forum and believes the state forum is biased
or less trustworthy. Additionally, the lengthy delay that abstention may
produce is likely to diminish both parties’ perceptions of courteous and
respectful treatment.
For federal judges, abstention may enhance perceptions of the
trustworthiness of the system as a whole: Sending a case to the most
qualified decisionmaker seems to increase the likelihood that the
decision is sound. Although federal judges choosing to abstain would
experience a decrease in their own opportunity to make law, they may
feel positive about their voice and opportunity to be heard because they
have a voice in the decision not to consider the case. From the state court
perspective, such abstention is likely to increase perceptions of
procedural justice on all fronts: abstention gives the state judge the
opportunity for voice in settling questions of state law, provides the state
judge with reason to believe that the federal judge is unbiased and
trustworthy, and demonstrates that the federal judge respects the state
judge.
Certification is the second procedure that may ameliorate the
tension between state and federal courts. When a federal court is
presented with an important question about state law, the federal court
210
can ask the state court for its opinion. Beyond the value of getting the
211
legal question substantively correct and the benefit of not creating
212
contrasting precedent between the two systems, certification may
provide procedural justice to state court judges. The process not only
213
permits the state court judge to offer her opinion, providing voice, but
it also signals respect and deference to the state court system’s
capabilities to determine its own state law. Additionally, it suggests that
federal courts are not seeking to impose their own normative framework
onto questions of interpretation of state law, which will augment
214
perceptions of trustworthiness and neutrality. Although this view of
deference and respect to state courts is widely held in the literature on

210. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts: A
Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. Legis. 157, 178 (2003).
211. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of
State Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1672, 1698 (2003) (noting that a state’s highest court—the “definitive”
authority—typically offers the answer to a certified question).
212. See Cochran, supra note 210, at 210–11. But see Hon. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask
a Silly Question . . ., 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 677, 690 (1995) (downplaying the importance of
consistency between a federal court decision and a later decision by the state’s highest court).
213. See Nash, supra note 211, at 1697 (“[Certification] gives the state judiciary the opportunity to
rule on important issues of state law in cases in which it might not otherwise have had the chance.”).
214. See id. (“The prerogative of a state government to establish and define its own state law is
enhanced by [certification] . . . .”).
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215

certification, others have taken a different view, arguing that the
certification process actually demonstrates disrespect to the state court by
unreasonably and willfully treating state law as foreign, acting as though
216
it is alien, mystifying, and practically occult in its opacity, as well as
treating it as less essential to the nation’s legal development than federal
217
law.
Certification procedures, when they work smoothly, may also offer
state legislators heightened feelings of procedural justice. First, the
legislation will be heard and considered by the state judicial body that,
presumably, the legislators expected to be the ultimate audience for their
work, which may increase perceptions of voice. Second, it seems likely
that state legislators will be more trusting of the state court, and also will
believe the state to be more neutral in its actions towards state behavior
than a federal court might be. Finally, state legislators presumably share
some strong identification with the state government, as well, and the
respect and courtesy shown to the state from the federal system through
certification may be appreciated by the legislators. Similarly, the state
executive may appreciate certification procedures as a fair process from
voice, neutrality, trust, and courtesy perspectives.
In contrast, however, the certification process adds delay to the
218
process of litigation —indeed, many certified questions are not
219
answered —and this delay may be interpreted as frustrating the voice of
the individual litigants. Certification may also frustrate the voice of the
federal court, which will most likely—after its initial decision to certify
the question—remain silent until such time as the state court responds.
Additionally, to the extent that certification puts a question of state law
in front of a less impartial decisionmaker—contrary to the very reason
for creating diversity jurisdiction to begin with—it will diminish
220
procedural justice perceptions by litigants. On the other hand, the
federal judiciary may not feel that its voice is diminished if it believes
221
that it is not qualified to offer an opinion. Finally, the delay by state
courts in responding to certified questions, the lack of response entirely
215. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified
Questions in New York, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 373 (2000).
216. See Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 114, 154 (2009).
217. See id. at 158–59.
218. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, Certification of Questions of Law: Federalism in Practice
67 (1995); Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590, 591 (1977); Sandra
Schultz Newman, Certification of State Law Questions: Pennsylvania’s Experience in the First Five
Years, 75 Pa. Bar Ass’n Q. 47, 57 (2004).
219. See M. Bryan Schneider, “But Answer Came There None”: The Michigan Supreme Court and
the Certified Question of State Law, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 273, 325 (1994).
220. Nash, supra note 211, at 1698.
221. Most judges—at both the state and federal levels—appear to support the certification process,
in particular because it “improves federal-state comity.” Goldschmidt, supra note 218, at 66; see also
Cochran, supra note 210, at 166.
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in some cases, the ensuing delay in case resolution, the expense incurred
by additional proceedings, and the feelings engendered by a challenge to
one’s forum choice may all increase perceptions of discourtesy, so that
both individual litigants and the federal judiciary feel they have been
222
treated disrespectfully and thus with low procedural justice.
C. Abstention
As noted above, abstention is a doctrine whereby federal courts
decline to hear a case in which jurisdiction is otherwise proper. There are
three basic types of abstention: abstention because of unclear state law
(Pullman, Thibodaux, or Burford abstention), abstention to avoid
interference with pending state proceedings (Younger abstention), and
abstention to avoid duplicative litigation in the state court (Colorado
223
River abstention). Each of these doctrines has potential procedural
justice effects. After a brief caveat, I consider them in turn below.
Abstention doctrines are notoriously difficult to understand for law
students, lawyers, judges, and certainly not least, litigants and the public.
Thus, while I analyze these doctrines below, I cannot suggest that any
given litigant or even her counsel will fully experience all of the potential
effects I describe. The degree to which any effect may occur may depend
on counsel’s explanations; when counsel fails to offer any explanation at
all for the twists and turns a case may take, the opacity of the system as a
224
whole seems likely to produce a perception of low procedural justice.
Nonetheless, it is clear that abstention does have effects on parties and
the public: the recent case involving California’s same-sex marriage ban,
225
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, in which the Ninth Circuit abstained from a
question of state law and certified that question to California’s highest
226
court, demonstrates that such practices do create impressions of
fairness (or unfairness) in the public eye. Especially in light of this type
of case, exploring the possible permutations of abstention’s procedural
justice effects is a worthwhile exercise. To the extent that a lawyer, a
sophisticated client, a client whose lawyer does explain procedure, or
even the public understands at least some of the abstention process,
these effects may be possible.

222. More fine-grained analysis of courtesy and respect seem largely inapposite in the structural
context. Assuming that the courts do not go out of their way to use offensive or disparaging language,
plain factual exposition ought to suffice in these contexts.
223. Chemerinsky, supra note 198, at 783–85, 800–03, 819–21, 872–73. Volumes have been written
about the scope, merit, and wisdom of these doctrines; that is not my aim here.
224. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
225. 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2011).
226. Order Certifying a Question to the Supreme Court of California at 1–2, Perry, 591 F.3d 1147
(2011) (No. 10-16696).
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Unclear State Law

There are three bases for abstention because of unclear state law:
(1) abstention to avoid constitutional rulings (Pullman abstention),
(2) abstention in diversity cases (Thibodaux abstention, discussed in the
227
above Subpart on diversity ), and (3) abstention to defer to complex
state administrative procedures (Burford abstention).
When federal courts abstain on the grounds set forth in Railroad
228
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., they are doing so because “a
state court’s clarification of state law might make a federal court’s
229
constitutional ruling unnecessary.” The Supreme Court noted three
reasons for abstaining in such circumstances. First, abstention in this type
of case could avoid “needless friction” between the state and federal
230
systems. Second, abstention will reduce the likelihood of the federal
231
court making mistakes as it interprets state law. Third, the Court
suggested that abstention in these cases would be a way to avoid
232
unnecessary constitutional rulings. For abstention based on Burford v.
233
Sun Oil Co., the rationale is slightly different: to “protect[] complex
234
state administrative processes from undue federal interference.” In
Pullman cases, the federal court retains jurisdiction over the case, but in
235
Burford cases, the case is dismissed entirely.
For individual litigants, abstention is likely to frustrate perceptions
of voice and opportunity to be heard. Notwithstanding the fact that
defendants are typically happy with the status quo and have less interest
in the case moving forward quickly, abstention forestalls any opportunity
for either party to have its case heard. This stagnation may be of
substantive benefit to the defendant, but it is not useful in fostering
procedural justice perceptions. Nonetheless, the voice effects of
abstention are likely to be greater on the plaintiff, since the defendant’s
voice is relevant only in relation to his opportunity to defend himself
against the plaintiff’s allegations. And if the plaintiff has no opportunity
to be heard, then the defendant is likely to be less concerned—even
procedurally—with an opportunity to likewise present her defense. From
the perspective of impartiality and trust, the forum-selecting party
presumably will experience a drop in procedural justice assessments,
while a party who was in the forum unwillingly may believe that the state

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
Chemerinsky, supra note 198, at 785.
Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
Id. at 499–500.
Id. at 501.
319 U.S. 315 (1943).
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989).
Chemerinsky, supra note 198, at 808.
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court or administrative body is more impartial and trustworthy. Finally, it
is not clear how litigants would perceive abstention with regard to
courtesy and respect. On one hand, the tremendous delay that abstention
adds to proceedings, and the dismissive nature of a court’s response, may
suggest disrespect for the litigants. On the other hand, a refusal to
consider the question because another tribunal may have more expertise
in handling the matter or because of courtesy to the governmental body
that originated the right in question may not appear discourteous or
disrespectful to individual litigants.
From the perspective of the state and federal actors involved,
abstention in Pullman and Burford cases seems likely to foster
perceptions of procedural justice on the part of the state courts,
legislators, and executives. Indeed, the Court’s suggestion that one of
Pullman abstention’s goals is to avoid friction between the systems itself
indicates that the doctrine has procedural justice implications. While
reducing erroneous results and limiting unnecessary decisions are
instrumental goals related to the accuracy of the judicial system, reducing
friction suggests a more dignitary or relational goal for abstention. If, in
cases involving abstention, federal judges are determining whether or not
to decide certain types of matters that state governmental authorities
(whether judges or administrative agency actors) may prefer to
determine for themselves, then state actors will be more satisfied with
the outcome when they have experienced procedural justice. Here,
federal court abstention gives the state actors greater voice and
opportunity to express themselves, sends a signal that federal courts are
not biased and can be trusted to leave states to manage their own
business, and shows courtesy and respect to the state system of
government by allowing it to self-govern and interpret its own statutes. It
may be that even occasional abstention by federal courts is sufficient to
provide state actors with broader procedural justice benefits. That is, the
ultimate division of labor in a larger set of cases is at issue, but being
provided procedural justice in some subset of those cases suggests to
state actors that the federal judiciary is handling its division of court
business, more generally, in a procedurally just manner.
2.

Pending State Proceedings
236

In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court created an abstention
doctrine that prevented federal courts from interfering with pending
237
state court criminal proceedings, in part on comity grounds. The scope
of Younger abstention was subsequently broadened to include civil

236. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
237. Id. at 44. The decision also relied heavily on equity jurisprudence principles. Id. at 43–44.
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238

proceedings. But civil Younger abstention is fairly narrow: a federal
court may not enjoin or otherwise interfere with a private civil state
proceeding, and should abstain from hearing the case only when there is
239
an important state interest involved.
From the perspective of individual litigants, the federal courts’
refusal to hear a case involving a state court proceeding may decrease the
plaintiff’s experience of voice in the federal action, as the plaintiff’s effort
to give voice to concerns before a federal judge is stifled. On the other
hand, for the defendant in the federal action, such abstention is likely to
increase feelings of voice, because defendants will feel that they have had
the opportunity to be fully heard in their preferred forum and will not be
forced to divide potentially scarce resources to present cases in both
forums. From a perspective of neutrality and trust, a party seeking a
federal forum may do so because of distrust of the state forum, so
abstention will decrease that party’s assessments about the neutrality of
the decisionmaker, who may decide both the actual litigation and where
the case will be heard. The party seeking federal court relief may also
believe that the federal court’s refusal to hear the case is discourteous or
disrespectful.
Discussions about the comity rationale for Younger abstention
explicitly invoke concerns about harmony between federal and state
courts. For example, Martin Redish has suggested, in arguing in favor of
abstention in these cases, that federal court injunctions may disrupt state
240
proceedings and are likely to engender ill will towards federal judges.
In contrast, Erwin Chemerinsky noted that the claim about friction is
“based on an assumption about the likely psychological reactions of state
court judges,” and that in most cases, these judges “probably will not
241
even know that an injunction has been issued.” Chemerinsky further
argued that even if the state judges did know of the federal injunction,
they would likely welcome the decrease in their workload and would be
particularly pleased to be relieved of a controversial case. He also
suggested that state court judges might take no “insult” from the removal
of the case from their purview: this abstention “is no more of an affront
242
to state courts than is the existence of removal jurisdiction.”
The procedural justice analysis differs. From the perspective of
voice, an injunction diminishes state courts’ opportunity to be heard on
matters of importance. Additionally, state courts’ opportunity to be

238. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 416 (1979).
239. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc, 481 U.S. 1, 12 (1987); see also Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d
101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
240. Redish, supra note 186, at 344–45.
241. Chemerinsky, supra note 198, 830–31; see also Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law
of Federal Courts, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 59, 70 n.65 (1981).
242. Chemerinsky, supra note 198, at 831.
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heard on the very question of whether they may consider the issue is
completely nonexistent when a federal court unilaterally enjoins the state
court proceeding. Thus, abstention to allow the state case to proceed is
likely to enhance the state courts’ perception of voice, especially because
such abstention is only warranted for those cases that most clearly
involve important state interests. Abstention is also likely to enhance
state actors’ perceptions that the federal judiciary is unbiased and
trustworthy; an injunction of a current state proceeding might engender
feelings that the federal court is making a grab for power that state actors
may not perceive as bias-free. Finally, abstention may signal respect and
deference to state courts, whereas an injunction may appear discourteous
and disrespectful of state authority.
3.

Duplicative Litigation

When parallel proceedings exist in both federal and state forums,
principles of res judicata mean that whichever court is the first to rule on
the identical issues will have the dispositive word on the outcome. In
243
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, the
Supreme Court provided that a federal court could abstain only in
exceptional circumstances from hearing a case when there was a
244
concurrent state action. In most cases, then, abstention because of
concurrent litigation is not permitted.
From a procedural justice viewpoint, individual litigants are able to
participate fully in both state and federal jurisdictions. On one hand,
litigating in two forums provides multiple opportunities for voice, but on
the other hand, presenting one’s case in two forums presents a resourcemanagement problem that may undercut the ability to present one’s case
fully in either court. The effect of allowing the case to proceed in both
forums on parties’ perceptions of their opportunity to be heard is
uncertain. From a neutrality and trust standpoint, the litigants may
simply disagree about the most neutral forum; the party who prefers to
be in federal court, then, is likely to be more dissatisfied with a decision
to abstain on procedural justice grounds. From a courtesy and respect
perspective, the party who initiated the first action may feel that the
existence of a second action is disrespectful.
From the perspective of the judicial actors involved, federal judges
ought to feel increased voice when they do not abstain, while state actors
ought to feel increased voice when abstention does occur. When a
federal court hears a duplicative case, it does not seem to implicate
neutrality and trust concerns by state actors; when a federal court

243. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
244. Id. at 817–18. There is great disagreement about what “exceptional circumstances” means,
and a discussion of this question is outside my scope here.
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abstains, it may heighten the perception of state actors that the federal
court wants to act neutrally. Abstention signals courtesy and respect
from the federal to the state court, but a refusal to abstain—when there
is no special basis for such abstention beyond duplicativeness—does not
245
seem particularly disrespectful to the state court, either.

IV. Implications of the Psychology of Procedural Justice
for Law and Psychology
An examination of the way in which individuals involved in our
federal civil justice system may experience procedural justice demonstrates
that certain practices and rules are more likely than others to produce
subjective assessments of fairness, and sometimes may have differing
effects on different parties. Understanding the antecedent factors that
produce judgments about fairness is critical to ensuring a system design
that meets expectations for fairness, and in turn such system design can
yield increased deference to legal authorities and greater perceptions of
246
legitimacy. When litigants and other players in the legal system have an
opportunity for voice, feel that a decisionmaker is trustworthy and
neutral, and believe that they have been treated with courtesy and
respect, they are more likely to believe that the decisionmaking process
is fair and that the system is legitimate.
One concern about a psychological procedural justice approach,
however, is that individuals may define fairness—including its shared
antecedents—differently. While one person might care most about voice,
another might care more about courtesy. While one party might find one
set of behaviors courteous, another might find those same behaviors
brusque. Indeed, the very basis of the psychology of procedural justice—
measuring subjective perceptions of fairness—suggests the limitations of
a one-size-fits-all template for procedural fairness. Although very few
studies have sought to separate the effects of structural factors from the
247
effects of individual differences on procedural justice judgments,
implicitly assuming, instead, that most of the variability in judgments
comes from external structural features of dispute resolution
mechanisms, it is certainly plausible that individual differences represent

245. I do not mean to imply that there are no substantive or distributive implications related to
abstention. Presumably, no party would seek abstention unless they believed that it would provide a
litigation advantage. However, I restrict my analysis to the procedural justice implications of the
doctrine rather than the distributive justice implications.
246. A discussion about the potential to manipulate procedural justice variables in order to create
a “false consciousness effect,” in which people receive substantively poor outcomes but are satisfied
because of fair process, is outside the scope of this Article. For a useful review of literature on this
point, see generally MacCoun, supra note 20.
247. But see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Objective Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments
in Bilateral Negotiation (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Author).
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a significant challenge to designing systems that appear fair to all
participants.
At the same time, however, because findings have demonstrated
248
that individuals rely on the same set of factors in making judgments,
even if the relative weight may differ between settings or individuals,
these factors serve as a useful focal point in assessing the successes and
failures of our procedural rules and doctrine. Additionally, studies have
shown that procedural justice effects are widespread and that both the
effects and the antecedents of procedural justice often cut across gender,
249
culture, and racial divisions. Individuals are often alike in their
valuation of fair process, and they are often similar in the ways that they
make procedural justice assessments: they converge in valuing voice, a
neutral and trustworthy decisionmaker, and courteous and respectful
treatment. Even so, individuals may differ, as discussed above, over when
they believe they have been treated fairly. And in some situations, the
same rule may have different effects—not just on different parties to
litigation, but on different individuals who have different ways of, and
thresholds for, assessing courtesy, or neutrality, or trustworthiness, or
voice. But these shared antecedent factors at least provide a useful
beginning point in thinking through the likely effects of certain rules.
More research on individual differences in assessments about the
antecedent variables of procedural justice will be critical to the success of
any future efforts to think in a systematic way about the rules’ procedural
justice effects. If certain practices lead to consistently high fairness
assessments across a range of the population, we can be more positive
about adopting those practices. If there is high variability for any
particular behavior or reform, then it should not be adopted on the
grounds that it will increase procedural fairness. But where rules and
doctrine can be shaped to maximize perceptions of fairness—and where,
as with courtesy and respect, procedural justice perceptions can be
shaped at little additional cost or effort—decisionmakers and rule
makers ought to be aware of the psychology of procedural justice as it
will likely play out among litigants and system participants.
A focus on subjective perceptions has been rejected by some
theorists who believe that the very nature of subjectivity calls for
ignoring psychological procedural justice as meaningful in relation to the
250
crafting or analysis of rules. But this perspective is simply too narrow.
A psychological procedural justice perspective is a critical complement to
a philosophical and doctrinal approach. When theory and doctrine set
the threshold rules for fair process, it is important to be able to clarify
248. See Tom Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in The Handbook of
Negotiation and Culture 295, 300 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004).
249. See Lind, supra note 114, at 775.
250. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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whether those rules are able to effectuate the stated fairness goals. It
should not suffice for theorists and rule makers to create rules and
doctrine that they mean to be fair. Research on the psychology of
procedural justice offers insight into the human psychology of perceiving
fair process. When we better understand the mechanisms that drive
assessments of fair process, we can better hone our fairness rules to meet
those criteria, without losing a focus on normative theoretical
commitments to fair process.
Additionally, procedural justice research in psychology offers a
complement and a practical rejoinder to the debate among legal theorists
about how to weight instrumental and dignitary concerns in procedural
fairness. Although no research can purport to answer the question of
how properly to balance accuracy, cost, fairness, and efficiency in
designing procedures, the research on why people care about fair
treatment has several implications in considering this calculus. First, the
research shows that individuals are not solely instrumental in their desire
for fair process. People do care about fair process for relational and
251
dignitary reasons, in addition to its instrumental value. This suggests
that we ought to be careful to value the dignitary effects of process even
when they have no likely effect on outcome. This leads to a related point:
the procedural justice research also suggests that people value being
treated with courtesy and respect, a system feature that is not a part of
procedural due process analysis and does not speak in any way to
accuracy. However, courteous and respectful treatment is relatively
costless to provide, and such treatment may provide important societal
benefits that the instrumental model overlooks. Because procedural
justice research has demonstrated that people are not solely motivated
by instrumental concerns, a system for fair process that addresses their
needs ought to incorporate features that provide dignitary benefits,
especially when those benefits are likely to have almost no negative
impact on efficiency.

Conclusion
The legitimacy of our legal system is premised on its constitutional
roots, which guarantee due process of law. But in practice, the subjective
assessments about the quality of justice received will also influence
participants’ perceptions about legitimacy—in particular, the quality of
procedural justice received. A focus on the subjective perceptions of
participants in the legal system—on the psychology of procedural
justice—offers a valuable perspective on the way that real people
understand the legal system. Looking at specific legal rules and
structures through the lens of procedural justice provides a multifaceted
251. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 65, at 121.

Hollander-Blumoff_22 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

178

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/5/2011 11:33 PM

[Vol. 63:127

way to explore whether those rules and structures are effective in
producing perceptions of fair processes that motivate people to obey and
respect the law and legal system. Furthermore, considering rules and
doctrine from a procedural justice perspective in psychology helps us
understand and take seriously the effects of these rules and doctrines not
just from an instrumental but also a dignitary perspective.
In this Article, I have suggested that individual litigants will evaluate
the procedural justice of rules, behavior, and doctrine in court. More
controversially, I have suggested that other participants in the legal
process, such as judges, legislators, and executives, will also evaluate the
procedural justice of the legal system writ large—not just considering the
way that individual litigants’ cases are judged, but also considering the
way that judicial business is allocated between the state and federal
judiciaries. Of course, empirical research is needed to clarify and refine
our understanding of how individuals perceive our legal system with
252
respect to procedural justice. In particular, it would be useful to study
litigants’ procedural justice reactions to particular rules and behaviors in
litigation, as well as to broaden the empirical focus to study reactions of
judges and other government actors to different procedural mechanisms
for the allocation of judicial business. This project contributes to the
foundational conversation about what kinds of relationships we might
hope to explore.

252. The call for empirical research to help improve civil procedure is not a new one. See, e.g.,
Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 51 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 67, 84–85 (1988).

